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ABSTRACT: U.S. health spending is projected to increase from 16 percent of GDP in 2006 
to 20 percent in 2016—from $2 trillion to $4 trillion. Meanwhile, the number of uninsured 
Americans continues to rise. In this report prepared for The Commonwealth Fund Commission 
on a High Performance Health System, the authors examine 15 federal policy options that have 
the potential to lower health spending relative to projected trends. They include policies that 
would: produce and use better information for health care decision-making, promote health and 
enhance disease prevention, align financial incentives with quality and efficiency, and correct price 
signals in health care markets. Combining policies would capture the synergistic benefits of 
individual changes. If implemented along with universal health insurance, a combination of 
selected options could save $1.5 trillion in national health expenditures over 10 years, while also 
improving value in terms of access, quality, and health care outcomes. 
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PREFACE 
 
High and rising health care expenditures and the growing number of people who 
are uninsured are putting the health and economic security of the nation at risk. Despite 
health expenditures far above those of any other country, quality of care in the United 
States is highly variable, access is inequitable and declining, and there is widespread 
evidence of inefficiency in both the delivery and financing of health care. To spur and 
inform debate and stimulate action to achieve savings, while at the same time improving 
health care access, quality, and outcomes, The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a 
High Performance Health System presents the report, Bending the Curve: Options for 
Achieving Savings and Improving Value in U.S. Health Spending. 
 
The report is unique in two ways: 1) it focuses on total national health care 
expenditures, and 2) it presents estimates of the effects of policy options that are intended 
to moderate future cost growth in a manner that would yield higher value for the nation’s 
investment in health care. These options are not presented as the recommendations of the 
Commission, but they represent an array of initiatives that have been proposed and 
discussed in the context of improving health system performance. 
 
The analysis indicates that it should be possible for the nation to reduce projected 
spending trends while also improving value. Combining selected options in the context of 
reform to ensure affordable private or public health insurance coverage for all could yield 
$1.5 trillion in national health expenditure savings over 10 years, while achieving universal 
coverage and improved quality. Building consensus on the best ways to control health 
spending growth and achieve a high performance health system—and successfully 
implementing those changes—will require leadership and collaboration among all 
stakeholder groups in the public and private sectors. 
 
The Commission has sponsored this report to inform its development of future 
recommendations, as well as to stimulate broader discussion of how to “bend the 
curve”—that is, reduce the projected trend in health spending that threatens to engulf 
both the federal budget and the nation’s economy. With cost pressures mounting and 
coverage eroding, both the economic and human consequences of failing to act are 
significant, and will become more so in the future. 
 
James J. Mongan, M.D.    Stephen C. Schoenbaum, M.D. 
Chairman      Executive Director 
The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Health spending in the United States is projected to increase from 16 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006 to 20 percent in 2016—from $2 trillion to $4 
trillion in 10 years. At the same time, the number of people who are uninsured is rising 
sharply, including a growing proportion of middle-income families. While rising costs are 
putting all sectors of the economy at risk, the nation lacks a concrete, realistic plan for 
adopting a different approach that could achieve savings and improve value. 
 
To inform national discussions and spur progress toward such a plan, The 
Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System sponsored this 
report, which examines 15 federal policy options and their potential for lowering health 
spending over the next 10 years, relative to projected trends. 
 
These options are not presented as the recommendations of the Commission, but 
they represent a range of approaches that have been proposed to address the various factors 
that contribute to high and rising costs and represent sources of inefficiency in the current 
health care delivery and financing systems. The report focuses on federal policies for three 
reasons: the federal government accounts for the largest portion of health spending; 
changes at the federal level would probably have the broadest immediate effects on 
national health spending; and federal policies, particularly those adopted by Medicare, 
frequently serve as a model for policies adopted at the state and local levels and by the 
private sector. Nonetheless, many of the policy options could be applied by states and 
private payers as well. Indeed, collaborative efforts across public and private sectors will be 
essential for achieving higher performance and greater value. 
 
The report’s findings illustrate that it would be possible to reduce national 
expenditures over the next decade while simultaneously improving access, quality, and 
population health. Achieving significant savings, however, will require a combination of 
policies that span strategic areas amenable to policy action at the federal level. These 
include policies that: 
 
• Produce and use better information for health care decision-making; 
• Promote health and enhance disease prevention efforts; 
• Align financial incentives with health quality and efficiency; and 
• Correct price signals in health care markets. 
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By applying these policies collectively, the nation would be able to capture the 
synergistic benefits of specific changes that, if implemented individually, would yield more 
modest reductions in projected spending trends. Further, policies aimed at achieving 
savings while also improving quality would be even more effective in improving overall 
health system performance if they were combined with a policy to extend affordable 
health insurance coverage to everyone in the United States. On a foundation of universal 
coverage, payment and other policies could apply to a larger share of the population. 
Well-designed insurance also has the potential to lower administrative costs while ensuring 
access—both improve value. Combining selected options with affordable health insurance 
for all could yield $1.5 trillion in national health expenditure savings over 10 years, and 
enable a more integrated, systemic approach to health care delivery and financing. 
 
Modeling the future impact of complex policy changes is inherently challenging 
and risky. The technical challenges include the uncertainty of estimating dynamic effects 
over time. Further, the estimates assume effective design and implementation, and 
therefore do not reflect the difficulty of achieving agreement on what changes are 
necessary, designing the often complex policies necessary to achieve those changes, or 
making the organizational adjustments required to implement them successfully. 
 
What is certain is that the stakes are very high if we continue on our current path 
of escalating costs and eroding coverage. 
 
Options and Results 
This report contains analyses of a set of 15 federal policy options that could ease health 
care cost pressures while at the same time either enhancing or maintaining access, quality, 
efficiency, equity, and the health system’s capacity to innovate and improve. These 
options include federal policies targeted to produce and use better information, promote 
health and prevent disease, align incentives with quality and efficiency, and correct price 
signals in the health care market. The Commonwealth Fund contracted with the Lewin 
Group* to estimate the potential effects of each option, with a focus on total national 
health expenditures and the distribution of expenditures across payers—the federal 
government, state and local governments, private employers, and households. The 
estimates include effects on incremental and cumulative spending over a 10-year period, 
from 2008 to 2017. A summary of the options modeled in this report, their objectives, 
and the estimated effects on spending are described below. 
 
                                                 
* The Lewin Group is one of the leading health care and human services consulting firms in the United 
States, with more than 35 years of experience serving organizations in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. 
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Producing and Using Better Information 
These options are intended to address information barriers that contribute to the 
inefficiency of our health system and undermine care outcomes. The transparent availability 
of information and the incentives and ability to use it are critical prerequisites for effective, 
safe, coordinated care and the development of policies that encourage such care. 
 
• Promoting Health Information Technology. Accelerate provider adoption of 
health information technology (HIT) with the capacity for decision support and to 
share patient health information across sites of care, financed by an assessment of 
1 percent on insurance premiums and Medicare outlays. After initial investment 
costs, estimated net health system savings could reach $88 billion over 10 years as 
HIT capacity is improved. Net savings would accrue by year 10 to all except 
private payers, which would realize cumulative savings in following years. 
• Center for Medical Effectiveness and Health Care Decision-Making. 
Invest in the knowledge needed to improve decision-making and incorporate 
information about the relative clinical and cost-effectiveness of alternative 
treatment options into insurance benefit design. By generating the information and 
creating payment and cost-sharing incentives for providers and consumers to use it, 
this policy option could result in estimated health system savings of $368 billion 
over 10 years, shared by all payers. 
• Patient Shared Decision-Making. Help patients decide between alternative 
treatment options by requiring providers to educate Medicare beneficiaries about 
alternatives through use of patient decision aids (such as videos and other 
materials). This option could save an estimated $9 billion over 10 years, primarily 
for the Medicare program. System savings would be greater if this policy were 
extended to Medicaid and private insurance. 
 
Promoting Health and Disease Prevention 
These options focus on the substantial costs to the health system of the care and 
complications of chronic diseases, such as diabetes or heart disease. They seek to lower the 
incidence of disease through public health initiatives and improved care. 
 
• Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use. Increase federal taxes on tobacco 
products by $2 per pack for cigarettes, with revenues going toward support of 
national and state tobacco control programs. If revenues were invested in effective 
programs, this option could yield $191 billion in health system savings over 10 
years, shared by all payers. State savings would be largely offset by reduced state 
tobacco tax revenue, as consumption of tobacco products fell. 
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• Public Health: Reducing Obesity. Establish a new nominal tax on sugar-
sweetened soft drinks of 1 cent per 12-ounce drink to finance national and state 
obesity prevention programs. If successful in reducing rates of increases in obesity 
and associated costs, the option could yield an estimated $283 billion in savings 
over 10 years, shared by all payers. 
• Positive Incentives for Health. This option would use federal funds and 
incentives to encourage the federal government, state governments, and private 
employers to create positive incentives for individuals to engage in wellness 
programs and healthy behavior, and to cover preventive services. Such a focus on 
high value benefit designs could save an estimated $19 billion over 10 years, with a 
net investment by the federal government of $2 billion. 
 
Aligning Incentives with Quality and Efficiency 
These policy options are intended to address the misalignment of incentives in our fee-for-
service payment system and the private insurance market. The options modeled include: 
 
• Hospital Pay-for-Performance. Establish a Medicare pay-for-performance 
program for all hospitals similar to the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS)/Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration. This option 
could result in health system savings of $34 billion over 10 years, with the major 
share accruing to the federal government through reduced Medicare payments, 
primarily from decreased hospital readmissions. If all payers adopted similar 
policies, estimated savings would be greater. 
• Episode-of-Care Payment. Transform the current Medicare fee-for-service 
payment system to fixed prospective payments per episode of care (based on the 
current distribution of cumulative fee-for-service costs per episode). This policy 
would change Medicare payment methods to reward and encourage more 
efficient, coordinated care. When applied to hospital and ambulatory care, this 
could generate estimated net health system savings of $229 billion over 10 years. 
Other payers could avoid cost-shifting by emulating this payment approach. 
• Strengthening Primary Care and Care Coordination. Change reimbursement 
to primary care physician practices to support enhanced primary care services, such 
as care coordination, care management, and easy access to appropriate care. Under 
this option, Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries would be enrolled in “medical 
homes” that have this enhanced capacity. Mandatory enrollment could result in net 
health system savings of $194 billion over 10 years, with savings accruing to all 
payers. Estimated savings would be larger if this approach were adopted by all payers. 
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• Limit Federal Tax Exemptions for Premium Contributions. To provide 
incentives to enroll in high-value health insurance plans, cap the tax-deductibility 
of employer-sponsored insurance premiums. The option could reduce national 
spending by an estimated $131 billion over 10 years, with savings in federal tax 
expenditures exceeding that amount. However, to avoid putting sicker, older, and 
low- or modest-income families at increased health and financial risk, and to avoid 
potentially undermining current employer-sponsored pooled-risk group coverage, 
this change would have to be combined with universal coverage and changes in 
insurance market rules. 
 
Correcting Price Signals in the Health Care Market 
These options seek to address the tendencies of the current pricing mechanisms to send 
the wrong signals to participants in the market. These include signals for higher rather than 
lower costs and pricing mechanisms that support inefficient care and wide variation in 
costs without corresponding differences in quality and outcomes across geographic areas. 
 
• Reset Benchmark Rates for Medicare Advantage Plans. Modify the current 
Medicare Advantage payment methodology by setting the benchmark rate for 
plans in each county at a level equal to the county’s projected per capita spending 
under traditional Medicare. The current mechanism for setting the benchmark 
rates, which results in payments to plans that are higher than what costs would 
have been in traditional Medicare, sends a price signal through the market that 
encourages higher rather than lower costs among those plans. By recalibrating 
benchmark rates, this option could result in an estimated health system savings of 
$50 billion over 10 years and reduce federal spending by $124 billion over the 
decade. However, spending by Medicare beneficiaries would increase by $74 
billion, in the form of additional private premiums for those individuals who 
replace the additional benefits available under the current Medicare Advantage 
payment rates, as well as extra payments required for those who enroll in plans 
with bids that exceed the benchmark rate. 
• Competitive Bidding. Establish competitive bidding among Medicare plans and 
traditional Medicare. This option would replace the current administered pricing 
mechanism in Medicare Advantage with a system that would determine prices 
through increased competition on the basis of quality and efficiency. The option 
could result in estimated health system savings of $104 billion over 10 years and 
substantial reductions in federal spending over the same period. Spending by 
Medicare beneficiaries would increase by $178 billion, as they may choose to stay 
in more expensive plans (or remain in traditional Medicare where it is more 
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expensive than the available alternatives), or may choose to pay to restore extra 
benefits they currently receive under Medicare Advantage. This option would 
have to be designed carefully to avoid drawing healthier beneficiaries away from 
Medicare and putting elderly and disabled beneficiaries, as well as those with 
modest incomes, at risk. 
• Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices. Give the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the authority to negotiate or set price limits for Medicare 
prescription drug plans for their enrollees. This option could result in a net savings 
of $43 billion over 10 years, with a focus on dual eligibles and prescriptions within 
monopolized seller markets. Without provisions to prevent cost-shifting, all payers 
except the federal government could experience a net increase in spending. The 
potential impact of this option on innovation in the development of new effective 
drugs would have to be assessed. 
• All-Payer Provider Payment Methods and Rates. Require all payers to adopt 
Medicare payment rates and methods for hospitals and physicians. This option 
would provide higher payments for Medicaid patients and reduce the pressure on 
the prices paid by private insurers to offset Medicaid and other shortfalls. It would 
also address the fragmented system under which providers must deal with 
numerous payment mechanisms and reporting rules. The option could result in net 
system savings of $122 billion over 10 years, with the savings accruing to the 
private insurance industry. This estimate presumes the resolution of the payment 
cuts projected under the current sustainable growth rate mechanism for physician 
payments, and so does not reflect the projected cost of those changes. Moreover, 
to avoid undermining safety net providers, it would be necessary to redirect some 
of the savings to finance insurance expansion or uncompensated care pools. 
• Limit Payment Rate Updates in High-Cost Areas. Reduce Medicare 
spending growth by basing annual hospital and physician payment updates on cost 
per beneficiary in relation to a national benchmark. This option would focus more 
cost control pressure on high-cost regions and avoid across-the-board adjustments 
that otherwise would apply equally to low- and high-cost geographic areas. 
Limiting payment growth in high-cost regions could save $158 billion in health 
system spending over 10 years, with savings accruing to the federal government. 
Unless they followed Medicare’s lead, other payers in the affected regions could 
see increased costs as a result of cost-shifting. 
 
The estimated net effects of each of these options on national health spending, and 
on spending by payer group, are shown in exhibits ES-1 and ES-2, respectively. 
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Exhibit ES-1. Policy Options and Net Cumulative Impact on 
National Health Expenditures over One, Five, and 10 Years 
  
One-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Cumulative 
Five-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Cumulative
10-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Producing and Using Better Information    
1. Promoting Health Information Technology $8 $14 –$88 
2. Center for Medical Effectiveness and 
Health Care Decision-Making –$18 –$125 –$368 
3. Patient Shared Decision-Making –$1 –$4 –$9 
Promoting Health and Disease Prevention    
4. Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use –$5 –$64 –$191 
5. Public Health: Reducing Obesity –$3 –$61 –$283 
6. Positive Incentives for Health $0 –$5 –$19 
Aligning Incentives with Quality and Efficiency    
7. Hospital Pay-for-Performance –$2 –$14 –$34 
8. Episode-of-Care Payment –$17 –$96 –$229 
9. Strengthening Primary Care and 
Care Coordination –$5 –$60 –$194 
10. Limit Federal Tax Exemptions for 
Premium Contributions –$10 –$55 –$131 
Correcting Price Signals in the Health Care Market    
11. Reset Benchmark Rates for 
Medicare Advantage Plans –$3 –$20 –$50 
12. Competitive Bidding  –$7 –$42 –$104 
13. Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices –$3 –$16 –$43 
14. All-Payer Provider Payment Methods and Rates $2 –$23 –$122 
15. Limit Payment Updates in High-Cost Areas –$4 –$43 –$158 
Note: A negative number indicates spending decreases compared with projected expenditures (i.e., savings); 
a positive indicates spending increases. 
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Exhibit ES-2. Policy Options and Distribution of 10-Year Impact on 
Spending Across Payer Groups (in billions) 
  
Total 
NHE† 
 
Federal 
Gov’t 
State/ 
Local 
Gov’t 
 
Private 
Payer 
 
 
Households 
Producing and Using 
Better Information 
     
1. Promoting Health 
Information Technology –$88 –$41 –$19 $0 –$27 
2. Center for Medical Effectiveness 
and Health Care Decision-Making –$368 –$114 –$49 –$98 –$107 
3. Patient Shared Decision-Making –$9 –$8 $0 $0 –$1 
Promoting Health and 
Disease Prevention      
4. Public Health: 
Reducing Tobacco Use  –$191 –$68 –$35 –$39 –$49 
5. Public Health: Reducing Obesity –$283 –$101 –$52 –$57 –$73 
6. Positive Incentives for Health –$19 $2 –$12 –$4 –$5 
Aligning Incentives with 
Quality and Efficiency      
7. Hospital Pay-for-Performance –$34 –$27 –$1 –$2 –$4 
8. Episode-of-Care Payment –$229 –$377 $18 $90 $40 
9. Strengthening Primary Care 
and Care Coordination –$194 –$157 –$4 –$9 –$23 
10. Limit Federal Tax Exemptions 
for Premium Contributions –$131 –$186 –$19 –$55 $130 
Correcting Price Signals 
in the Health Care Market      
11. Reset Benchmark Rates for 
Medicare Advantage Plans –$50 –$124 $0 $0 $74 
12. Competitive Bidding –$104 –$283 $0 $0 $178 
13. Negotiated Prescription 
Drug Prices –$43 –$72 $4 $17 $8 
14. All–Payer Provider Payment 
Methods and Rates –$122 $0 $0 –$105 –$18 
15. Limit Payment Updates in 
High-Cost Areas –$158 –$260 $13 $62 $27 
Note: A negative number indicates spending decreases compared with projected expenditures (i.e., savings); 
a positive indicates spending increases. 
† In some cases, because of rounding, the sum of the payer group impact does not add up to the national health 
expenditures total. 
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Combining Individual Options with Affordable Coverage for All 
In addition to the individual options described above, we modeled the effects of several 
of those options under a scenario intended to provide affordable health insurance 
coverage for all. The universal coverage scenario is based on a policy that would expand 
affordable coverage through a blend of private and public group health insurance. Similar 
to the savings options above, this scenario is presented as one of a range of potential 
approaches aimed at accomplishing this goal, rather than as the particular policy favored 
and recommended by the Commission. We refer to this scenario as the Insurance 
Connector approach. 
 
The Insurance Connector approach builds on and connects current public and 
private group insurance through the creation of a new national entity that would offer a 
structured choice of private health plans as well as a Medicare option to individuals and 
small employers. Enrollment in some plan would be required. The availability of both 
publicly sponsored and private plans would help induce competition not only among 
private insurers, but also between private insurers and the public plan. This would put 
pressure on all plans to operate more effectively and efficiently. The expansion would 
achieve near-universal coverage. 
 
With insurance changes alone, total health system costs would increase by an 
estimated $15 billion in the first year and $218 billion over 10 years, as a result of 
improved access for those who are currently uninsured or underinsured.† As modeled, this 
scenario would increase spending by private employers and the federal government, 
because of financing provisions to make coverage affordable. State and local governments 
and households would experience net reductions in spending. 
 
To illustrate the potential of policies focused on better information, public health, 
improved incentives, and price signals in the context of universal coverage, we modeled 
the Insurance Connector approach together with the following options that were 
described above: Promoting Health Information Technology; Center for Medical 
Effectiveness and Health Care Decision-Making; Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use; 
Public Health: Reducing Obesity; Episode-of-Care Payment; Strengthening Primary Care 
and Care Coordination; Competitive Bidding; and Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices. 
 
In the context of universal coverage with a national insurance connector as 
described above, several of the Medicare-focused policies that are combined in this option 
                                                 
† This scenario offers the option of selecting Medicare. The modeling estimates that lower administrative 
costs and other features would partially offset costs of coverage expansion. 
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would apply to a larger number of people and therefore would have a larger estimated 
effect. Although not included in the modeling, in addition, the synergistic effects of 
implementing a combination of policies aimed at improving health system performance 
with universal coverage could be expected to lead to even greater savings. For example, 
the potential savings from electronic medical records (as well as the improvements in the 
quality and effectiveness of care) would be augmented if physicians also had expanded 
information on clinical effectiveness. 
 
This combined approach could lower national health expenditures by 1 percent 
initially and 6 percent after a decade, compared with baseline projections. These annual 
savings add up to cumulative 10-year savings over the current system baseline of more 
than $1.5 trillion, as shown in exhibits ES-3 and ES-4. As illustrated, the cumulative effect 
of the combination of options grows rapidly over time: the estimated reduction in national 
health expenditures in the first year is $31 billion, while the reduction over 10 years is 
more than 50 times greater; similarly, the net costs to federal government diminish rapidly 
over time as savings offset federal costs of insurance expansion. Further, by the end of a 
decade, the net federal costs could be negligible if bundled with options that focus on 
improving both the effectiveness and efficiency of care. 
 
Exhibit ES-3. Distribution of the Effect of Combination of 
Selected Individual Options with Insurance Connector Approach on Spending 
over One Year, Five Years, and 10 Years Across Payer Groups (in billions) 
  
Total 
NHE† 
 
Federal
Gov’t 
State/ 
Local 
Gov’t 
 
Private 
Payer 
 
 
Households
Combining selected individual options with Insurance Connector approach†† 
—after 1 year –$31 $31 –$14 $24 –$71 
—after 5 years –$407 $111 –$119 $87 –$486 
—after 10 years –$1,554 $158 –$380 $72 –$1,404 
Note: A negative number indicates spending decreases compared with projected expenditures (i.e., savings); 
a positive indicates spending increases. 
† In some cases, because of rounding, the sum of the payer group effect does not add up to the national health 
expenditures total. 
†† Selected options include: Promoting Health Information Technology; Center for Medical Effectiveness 
and Health Care Decision-Making; Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use; Public Health: Reducing Obesity; 
Episode-of-Care Payment; Strengthening Primary Care and Care Coordination; Competitive Bidding; and 
Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices. 
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Exhibit ES-4. Cumulative Impact on National Health 
Expenditures (NHE) of Insurance Connector Approach
Plus Selected Individual Options
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Note: Selected individual options include improved information, payment reform, and public health.
Source: Based on projected expenditures absent policy change and Lewin estimates.
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As shown in Exhibit ES-5, these estimated savings succeed in “bending the curve” 
to about halfway between the currently projected trend and the amount that would 
maintain the current proportion of GDP devoted to health spending. A policy of 
guaranteeing health insurance for all combined with selected savings options yields savings 
in national health expenditures of $1.5 trillion over 10 years. This represents an extremely 
large amount of resources that could be available to address other societal needs or wants, 
either within the health system or elsewhere. Moreover, an environment in which 
affordable health care is available, markets operate with better information, and payment 
reform offers potential for even greater savings, can produce dynamic, synergistic gains 
over the longer term. The first-order estimates are thus likely conservative compared with 
the potential gain over time. 
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Exhibit ES-5. Total National Health Expenditures, 2008–2017 
Projected and Various Scenarios
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Toward a Higher-Value Health System: Cross-Cutting Themes and Conclusions 
When one considers the results presented in this report, some key themes emerge: 
 
• Improvement is possible, and it is urgent to start now. The consequences 
of continuing the status quo, with respect to both human and economic costs, are 
very significant. The numbers of the uninsured are up sharply and moving up the 
economic ladder as middle-income families lose coverage. Costs are squeezing 
households, businesses, and the public sector. The option estimates illustrate that 
cost savings are achievable in the context of a high performance health system. 
They also demonstrate that early enactment of even modest changes has the 
potential for substantial cumulative benefits over several years. On a base of more 
than $2 trillion, even small percentage changes add up quickly. 
• Better information is a key to improved performance. It is difficult to 
improve the health system without information on current performance at the 
national, local, and individual provider levels. Transparency of information on 
quality and price is essential to the effectiveness of a number of policies that aim to 
achieve higher performance. A valid, publicly available database on provider 
performance, appropriately adjusted for patient conditions, is critical for focusing 
providers on improving both quality and efficiency, enabling payers to construct 
rewards and other mechanisms that encourage such behavior, and providing 
patients with the information they need to make appropriate choices. Data on the 
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patterns and causes of variations in spending across geographic areas is essential for 
developing policies to narrow such variations and providing consistently effective 
and appropriate care, regardless of location. 
• Addressing total health system costs, not shifting costs among sources of 
financing, should be the focus of policy action. Many of the policies 
proposed in the past have simply shifted costs from one payer source to another—
between government and employers, or from payers to beneficiaries and patients. 
Narrow policies that cut governmental budget outlays by simply displacing those 
costs onto Medicare beneficiaries, or by paying substandard rates to providers 
under Medicaid, are stopgap measures that do not fundamentally address 
underlying health care cost trends. 
• There are no magic bullets that by themselves fully address rising costs 
and key sources of inefficiency. Just as the steady increase in costs relative to 
incomes—which is projected to worsen over time—represents the cumulative 
effect of multiple and interacting factors, tackling cost levels and trends will require 
a coherent set of policies aimed at the misaligned incentives and structural flaws 
that plague our health system and produce the cost pressures we face. The design 
and effective implementation of policies matter. The solutions are not simple, and 
will require risk-taking and a willingness to invest, learn, and allow time for health 
systems and system capacity to improve through innovation. 
• A multifaceted approach that is combined with health insurance 
coverage for all can be designed to achieve substantial reductions in 
future spending growth. When combined with universal coverage, a bundled 
approach focused on system performance should be able to reduce the growth of 
spending significantly over the next decade while maintaining and enhancing the 
value of our health care dollar. But we need to start now, with a strategic, 
coherent set of goals, policies, and incentives designed to address the underlying 
factors that add to costs without adding commensurate value. 
• Value means more than savings in national health expenditures. Higher 
value includes improved performance on quality, equity, access, and healthy lives, 
in addition to savings. A policy proposal that generates a modest savings but 
achieves substantial improvement in access or health outcomes may be as valuable, 
or more so, than one that generates larger savings but makes minimal progress 
toward other health system goals. Options that extend health insurance to all, 
promote the public health, improve information and lead to more informed 
patient decisions, enhance quality and care coordination, and eliminate waste, 
duplication, and unnecessary care all contribute to value and performance. 
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• Reaching consensus will require a focus on the potential gain for the 
nation. The Commission has sought to identify options that are win-win—that is, 
that both achieve savings and contribute to improving key dimensions of health 
system performance. Yet, approaches that substantially reduce projected 
expenditures over time will by definition decrease revenues for some segments of 
the health care sector. 
• Achieving high performance will require that every stakeholder take part 
in finding solutions. Across the individual options, the estimated distribution of 
savings or net new cost varies among major payers—the federal government, state 
and local governments, employers, and households. Achieving national health 
system savings may require a shift in payment sources and an increase in federal 
outlays. Doing so will also require that providers be willing to address payment 
inequities where providers that care for the uninsured and the poor receive lower 
compensation that those with privately insured patients. Narrow self-interest is a 
major barrier to changes that have the potential to benefit all. 
Constructive approaches will also require political compromises, and a willingness 
to forsake ideological purity. As a nation, we will need to move beyond the point 
where everyone’s second choice is the status quo. 
• Leadership is critical. Building consensus will require leadership and 
public/private collaboration, and a coherent set of goals, policies, incentives, and 
tools. Options will work better if public and private policies align toward a 
common aim of achieving a high performance health system. Consensus will also 
require a whole-system view: aiming for improved cost trends while improving 
population health and achieving continuous improvement over time. 
 
The range of options considered in this report illustrates strategic approaches that 
could, in combination, ease cost pressures and create a path toward a higher performing, 
high-value health system. The goal of the analysis is to spark discussion and development 
of constructive national policies that could reduce costs and enable a more efficient, 
effective, and equitable health system. 
 
With cost pressures mounting and coverage eroding, the stakes are high. As a 
nation, we will all gain if we focus on improving the value we obtain for the $2 trillion 
we are now spending on health care—a sum that will continue to consume a greater and 
greater share of our nation’s economic resources, without yielding proportional gains to 
society, if we fail to act. 
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BENDING THE CURVE: OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS 
AND IMPROVING VALUE IN U.S. HEALTH SPENDING 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. health system is not producing high value commensurate with our national 
investment. Per capita spending in the U.S. is twice as high as in any other country; 
spending is 50 percent higher than in the next-highest country as a percentage of national 
income; and the gap is widening, as U.S. expenditure growth outpaces other nations’.1 
This high spending, however, does not translate into superior health outcomes. Across an 
array of dimensions, including access, quality, equity, and efficiency, we fall far short of 
achievable benchmarks.2 
 
Although advances in medical science and health care technology have yielded 
gains in the quality of life and healthy life expectancy, more-expensive care does not 
necessarily translate into higher-quality care. Within the U.S., we have broad evidence of 
excess costs, inefficient and poorly coordinated care, and variable quality. The fact that the 
highest-cost areas within the U.S. tend to have levels of quality and health outcomes that 
are similar to or worse than those in the lowest-cost areas indicates that reduced spending 
does not necessarily undermine quality. Moreover, various policies, if properly 
implemented, could improve quality while reducing spending.3 Comparisons across 
countries also support these conclusions.4 
 
The analysis presented in this report seeks to illustrate a range of federal policy 
options that could begin to be implemented now to generate savings. Using a framework 
that emphasizes achieving better access, quality, equity, efficiency, and health outcomes 
for the U.S. population, we identified areas for potential federal policy action and analyzed 
a range of policy options for their potential to generate savings over a 10-year period. On 
behalf of the Commission, The Commonwealth Fund contracted with the Lewin Group‡ 
to estimate the potential impacts of such options and their distribution across the major 
groups of payers for health care. 
 
These options are not presented as recommendations of the Commission. Rather 
they represent a range of approaches that have been proposed to address the factors 
contributing to high and rising costs and inefficiency within the current health care 
delivery and financing systems. This report focuses on federal policies, since changes at the 
                                                 
‡ The Lewin Group is one of the leading health care and human services consulting firms in the United 
States, with more than 35 years of experience serving organizations in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. 
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federal level are likely to have the broadest immediate effects on national health spending. 
Yet, many of these options could be applied by states and private payers as well. In fact, 
collaborative efforts across will likely be essential to achieve higher performance and 
greater value. 
 
As background for the analysis, the report first discusses national expenditure 
growth and its implications, and the need for improved value. This discussion also 
highlights factors contributing to high and rising costs that are potentially amenable to 
policy action without adverse effects on access, quality, equity, or health outcomes. 
 
Within this context, we present a framework for moving toward a more financially 
sustainable health system, examining each of 15 options for the potential to achieve savings 
and improve value. The analysis throughout focuses on the potential effect of these 
options on projected total national expenditures over 10 years, and also the distribution of 
those effects across the major groups that pay for health care (the federal government as 
well as state and local governments, businesses, and households). An example also is 
presented of the potential effect of combining multiple options in the context of affordable 
health care for all. The concluding section of the report summarizes the findings and 
discusses their implications. 
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THE RAPID GROWTH OF HEALTH SPENDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
National health spending has risen rapidly over the past two decades, exceeding average 
national household income and economic growth. As illustrated in Exhibit 1, the most 
recent projections indicate that total expenditures will double over the next decade to 
$4 trillion, increasing from 16 percent to almost 20 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP).5 Those projections put all sectors of the economy at risk—including federal and 
state budgets, businesses, and households. With the financing of total expenditures now 
roughly evenly split between private and public sources, rising costs are expected to be 
borne equally by the two sectors. 
 
Exhibit 1. Projected National Health Expenditures (NHE)
by Payer Source, 2005–2016
* Consumer payments include out-of-pocket payments and private health insurance.
Source: J. A. Poisal, C. Truffer, S. Smith et al., “Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes
Obscure Part D’s Impact,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive (Feb. 21, 2007):w242–w253.
  Projected 
Total 2005 2011 2016 
NHE (in billions) $1,987.7 $2,966.4 $4,136.9 
NHE as percent of GDP 16.0% 17.5% 19.6% 
Payer Source    
Private $1,085.0 $1,566.1 $2,123.3 
Consumer Payments* 943.8 1,347.0 1,811.9 
Other Private Funds 141.2 219.1 311.4 
Public 902.7 1,400.3 2,013.6 
Federal 643.7 1027.4 1,486.5 
State and Local 259.0 372.9 527.1 
 
 
 
As of 2005, U.S. health spending had already reached $2 trillion, or 16 percent of 
GDP.6,7 Although other high-income nations also face upward pressures on national 
health spending as a result of aging populations and advances in medical science, the U.S. 
stands alone in having both the most spending per person and rapid rates of growth over 
the past two decades.8 As shown in Exhibit 2, the U.S. spends almost twice as much on 
health care per person as any other country, and a far greater share of GDP. 
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Exhibit 2. International Comparison of Health Spending,
1980–2005
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The high and rising cost of health benefits puts economic pressure on businesses 
and undermines the standard of living of their workforces, and puts future generations of 
retirees at risk as health costs erode pensions and retirement savings. High premiums and 
out-of-pocket health care costs, in fact, are among the American public’s top health care 
concerns.9 With further growth expected in public and private insurance costs, 
government, employers, and individuals will be forced to make difficult budget choices 
absent policies to moderate those costs. 
 
Rising health expenditures have outpaced wages and incomes. While workers’ 
earnings, adjusted for inflation, have been flat over the past 20 years—and have even 
declined for those with middle or lower incomes—health insurance premiums have 
soared, except during a brief respite in the late 1990s. Since 2000, the average family 
premium for employer-based health insurance has grown 81 percent, while median family 
income has increased by only 11 percent.10 
 
Although the burden of higher health care costs is heaviest on those with low and 
modest incomes, costs have been increasing relative to income for those further up the 
economic ladder. As Exhibit 3 indicates, about one-third of nonelderly adults with 
incomes below the federal poverty level in 2003 spent at least 10 percent of their 
disposable incomes on out-of-pocket medical costs and insurance premiums, a steep 
increase since 1996, and the proportions among those in the middle and upper income 
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ranges also rose. Moreover, the difference between the lowest and highest income groups 
increased over that period.11 
 
Exhibit 3. Financial Burden for Low- and Middle-Income Families 
Is Increasing
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Note: Financial burden includes out-of-pocket costs for premiums for private insurance and other health services.
Source: J. S. Banthin and D. M. Bernard, “Changes in Financial Burdens for Health Care: National Estimates for the
Population Younger than 65 Years,” Journal of the American Medical Association, Dec. 13, 2006 296(22):2712–19.  
 
As a result of cost pressures, employer-based health insurance, which has been the 
predominant source of coverage, has shown signs of deteriorating. Between 2000 and 
2005, the proportion of workers receiving employer-provided health insurance declined 
from 74.2 percent to 70.5 percent—with the largest decreases among middle- and lower-
wage workers.12 The number of uninsured Americans has increased steadily from 2000 to 
2006, to 47 million, with projections indicating further increases through the middle of 
the next decade.13,14 Moreover, an estimated 16 million nonelderly adults with health 
insurance in 2003 lacked adequate protection against high out-of-pocket costs, despite 
having coverage all year; this problem was particularly acute among low-income adults, 
as shown in Exhibit 4.15 
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Exhibit 4. One-Third of Adults Ages 19–64 Are Uninsured
or Underinsured, as Are Two-Thirds of Low-Income Adults
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Similarly, the federal government and state governments are under pressure from 
increasing health care costs. Medicare, as the largest single purchaser of health care in the 
U.S.—directly accounting for 17.2 percent of total health spending in 2005—is vulnerable 
to the same increases faced by other payers, employers, and individuals. Moreover, 
Medicare faces a sharp increase in enrollment, as the baby-boom generation is about to 
retire—by 2025, there will be 71.3 million Medicare beneficiaries, an increase of 67 
percent over the number in 2005.16,17 
 
Like Medicare, Medicaid is subject to the spending pressures that prevail 
throughout the health system. In addition, Medicaid’s role as a safety net for those with 
low incomes makes it particularly vulnerable to general economic downturns. Enrollment 
and costs increase during times when state and local governments face stressful fiscal 
conditions and deficits due to loss of tax revenues. 
 
Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program combined 
accounted for 19 percent of total federal outlays in 2004. That share is expected to 
increase to 30 percent of federal outlays, with federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid 
increasing from $625 billion to $1.270 trillion, over the next decade.18 Similarly, Medicaid 
represented 17 percent of state general fund expenditures in 2003—second only to 
elementary and secondary education as a portion of state budgets—with projected 
increases squeezing out other essential state spending areas.19 
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If we fail to act, with a coherent set of policies to alleviate cost pressures, the price 
will be high. Conversely, with costs projected to continue to increase, if we succeed in 
reversing or reducing that trend over time, the potential for savings is significant. As 
shown in Exhibit 5, a policy option that had the effect of achieving a onetime reduction 
in the level of health care spending by 5 percent in 2007—without changing the projected 
growth rate—would achieve cumulative savings over a 10-year period of $1.56 trillion. A 
policy option that did not affect the level of spending in 2007, but reduced the projected 
growth rate in health care spending by 1 percent each year, would yield cumulative 
savings of $1.72 trillion over the same period. In combination, a onetime reduction of 5 
percent in the level of spending plus a 1 percent decrease in the projected rate of increase 
would produce a substantial long-term yield of $3.19 trillion, and leave us at 16.9 percent 
of GDP spent on national health expenditures by 2016—only a slight increase from 
today’s percentage—compared with 19.6 percent if nothing were done. Given the current 
U.S. spending trajectory, even modest changes in projected future increases would 
amount to a startling amount of estimated savings. 
 
Exhibit 5. Growth in National Health Expenditures (NHE)
Under Various Scenarios
Source: The Commonwealth Fund; data from J. A. Poisal, C. Truffer, S. Smith et al., “Health Spending Projections
Through 2016: Modest Changes Obscure Part D’s Impact,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive (Feb. 21, 2007):w242–w253.
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ACHIEVING SAVINGS THROUGH IMPROVED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
As our health system continues to offer the potential to extend and enhance the quality of 
our lives, there will be continued pressure to increase spending, testing the limits of our 
resources. The challenge for the nation is to ensure that we use our resources in ways that 
yield the highest possible value.20 Although there may be debate about how to allocate 
our resources among alternative priorities, it is clear that we need to change the way our 
health system is organized and financed. There is ample evidence that many of the factors 
that drive up spending do not yield corresponding improvements in health system 
performance and value.21,22 
 
It should be kept in mind that, although health spending has been increasing 
steadily and seemingly inexorably, both the $600 billion increase over the past five years 
and the $2 trillion increase projected over the next 10 years reflect the cumulative effect of 
many factors.23 Consequently, we cannot expect to eliminate the pressures caused by the 
rapid growth of health spending through some grand policy panacea, but rather through a 
combination of distinct strategic policy changes that together can achieve cumulative 
savings that could amount to substantial reductions from the level of spending that is 
currently projected. 
 
Achieving incremental and cumulative savings will require a focus on factors that 
contribute to excess costs without yielding value, and on long-term trends that are 
amenable to improvements in health policy, as described in a prior Commission report.24 
To address these factors, the Commission has developed a framework of four strategic 
areas for policy intervention to achieve a more financially sustainable health system: 
 
• producing and using better information 
• promoting health and disease prevention 
• aligning incentives with quality and efficiency 
• correcting price signals in the health care market. 
 
Under each of these headings, we offer in this report a set of specific policy 
options that have the potential to improve value and achieve savings relative to projected 
spending levels. 
 
In addition to these four targeted areas, extending affordable health insurance to all 
has the potential to achieve administrative savings and to enable a more integrated, whole-
system approach that also ensures access and financial security. Policies would also be more 
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effective if combined to foster more dynamic, systemic change, and applied to a larger 
share of the population. To illustrate the potential to achieve savings and improve value of 
multiple strategic initiatives in the context of universal coverage, we analyzed the effect of 
combining several of targeted options in a scenario that expands insurance to all with a 
mix of private and public-group insurance. 
 
The purpose of these analyses is to stimulate and inform the development of 
policies that will ease the cost pressures faced by the health system and yield greater value 
for the health care dollar, along the dimensions identified by the Commission in its 
previous reports: long, healthy lives; universal access; quality; equity; efficiency; and 
system innovation with the capacity to improve. With the nation at risk of enormous 
human and economic costs if we continue on the current path of escalating costs and 
eroding coverage, new policy directions are critical to the future health and economic 
security of the nation. 
 
The sections below first briefly discuss the intended effect for each set of strategies. 
There follows a more detailed discussion of the specific policy options. For each option, 
we include estimates of the effects on total system spending and the distribution of those 
effects among the federal government, state and local governments, private employers, and 
households over one-, five-, and 10-year periods, as provided by the Lewin Group.25 
 
Producing and Using Better Information 
Information barriers contribute substantially to the inefficiency of our health care system. 
In order for our providers to deliver the most effective and efficient care, they require 
information gathered from patient encounters—both with them and with the other providers 
seen by their patients—as well as the most up-to-date clinical decision support. Because of 
its volume, complexity, and geographic dispersion, this information can be effectively 
shared only with the widespread adoption of interoperable health information technology, 
which is the goal of the option, Promoting Health Information Technology (see page 16). As 
discussed below, health information technology, if implemented effectively and used 
appropriately, is a prerequisite “tool” for supporting systemic efforts to improve and 
coordinate care, and thus has value beyond its direct effect of lowering health care costs 
in the long run. 
 
In addition to information for improving efficiency, providers (and payers) need 
data to guide their clinical decisions. This must include comparative effectiveness 
information, to support decisions that result in the most effective and efficient treatment 
for each patient. This type of information would be generated by a Center for Medical 
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Effectiveness and Health Care Decision-Making (see page 19). In addition to assisting the 
provider at the point of care, this information would be useful to payers for coverage and 
payment determinations and patients in encouraging more informed participation in the 
health care process. 
 
From the perspective of patients, it is important that they be knowledgeable and 
engaged in health care decisions, especially when invasive surgical procedures are proposed 
that may have less radical or nonsurgical alternatives. This issue is addressed by the option, 
Patient Shared Decision-Making (see page 22). 
 
Promoting Health and Disease Prevention 
The treatment of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease, and their complications, 
places a large burden on our health system. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
estimate that the medical costs for people with chronic disease account for more than 75 
percent of total health care expenditures.26 Among the chronically ill, a disproportionate 
amount of cost is incurred by sicker patients with multiple chronic diseases. In the Medicare 
fee-for-service population, the costliest 15 percent of beneficiaries account for 75 percent 
of total spending.27 
 
The prevention and management of these conditions is dependent not only on 
what occurs within our health system, but also on environmental factors outside the health 
system—such as where we work and go to school. Active public health strategies aimed at 
Reducing Tobacco Use (see page 25) and Reducing Obesity (see page 27) can lessen the burden 
of such diseases and result in substantial savings to the health system. Another lever for 
changing patient behavior is the development of “value based” health benefit designs that 
encourage healthy behaviors and disease management, which is the goal of the option, 
Positive Incentives for Health (see page 29). 
 
Aligning Incentives with Quality and Efficiency 
Our current health system, which relies predominantly on fee-for-service payment, 
rewards overutilization and inefficiency. The fundamental incentives for providers must 
be changed in order to build a health system that is both sustainable and effective. A 
symptom of the current misalignment of incentives is the wide variation in cost and 
quality across the U.S.: In 2003, Medicare outlays per beneficiary ranged from $4,530 in 
Hawaii to $8,080 in New Jersey.28 Yet studies find no systematic relationship between 
higher spending and higher-quality care or longer lives for Medicare beneficiaries. On 
some measures, in fact, more spending appears to be associated with somewhat lower 
quality.29 Two options are presented in this report that seek to better align Medicare 
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payment with quality and efficiency: Hospital Pay-for-Performance (see page 32) and 
Episode-of-Care Payment (see page 36). Although each focuses on Medicare, both 
approaches could also be adopted by states and private payers. 
 
Our current health system also rewards specialty care over primary care, despite 
compelling evidence that regions with a higher prevalence of primary care deliver both 
higher-quality and lower-cost care.30 The option focused on Strengthening Primary Care and 
Care Coordination (see page 39) seeks to correct this imbalance and reward high-value 
primary care. 
 
The misalignment of incentives in current provider reimbursement is evidenced in 
the private insurance market as well, where tax laws offer limited incentives to choose 
more efficient health plans. This shortcoming is addressed in an option to Limit Federal 
Tax Exemptions for Premium Contributions (see page 41). 
 
Correcting Price Signals in the Health Care Market 
The current U.S. health system has given rise to certain pricing inefficiencies that could be 
addressed by correcting price signals in health care markets. Currently, private Medicare 
Advantage plans are paid at rates that exceed the anticipated costs of their enrollees by an 
average of 12 percent.31 The signal sent by these rates fails to encourage the level of 
efficiency of which those plans are thought to be capable. A policy that would Reset 
Benchmark Rates for Medicare Advantage Plans (see page 44) has been proposed to send a 
more appropriate price signal. In addition, Competitive Bidding (see page 48) among plans 
would make all plans compete on, and be accountable for, their quality and efficiency. 
 
U.S. pharmaceutical outlays have increased faster than spending on other health care 
services, and are the focus of another option, Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices (see page 51). 
In the late 1990s, pharmaceutical spending increased at an annual rate of 15.9 percent.32 
Even with slower annual growth in the 2000–2005 period (10.7%), pharmaceutical 
spending is growing at a faster rate than spending on hospital services (8.0%), physician 
services (7.9%), and nursing home and home health care (6.1%). 
 
Provider payment rates, although rising at a slower rate than pharmaceutical spending 
and health plan administrative costs, are still rising faster than inflation and represent yet 
another opportunity for greater efficiency. Two options for addressing provider payment 
would establish All-Payer Provider Payment Methods and Rates (see page 54) and Limit 
Payment Updates in High-Cost Areas (see page 58). The former option would address price 
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differentials across insurance sectors, while the latter option would focus efforts on 
constraining spending growth in high-cost geographic areas. 
 
Combining Individual Options with Affordable Coverage for All 
In addition to the individual options described above, we modeled the impact of several of 
those options under a scenario intended to provide affordable coverage for all. To provide 
an insurance context for this estimate, we selected an example of a policy proposal 
intended to expand coverage through a blend of private and public group health 
insurance. Similar to individual options focused on savings, this scenario is presented as 
one of a range of proposals aimed at accomplishing its intended objective, rather than as 
the particular way favored and recommended by the Commission. We refer to this 
scenario as the Insurance Connector approach (see page 65). 
 
The Insurance Connector approach builds on and links to current public and 
private insurance through the creation of a new national entity that offers to individuals 
lacking group coverage and small employers a structured choice of private health plans as 
well as a Medicare option. Enrollment in some plan would be required. By offering a 
choice of both publicly sponsored and private plans, this approach seeks to induce more 
effective competition not only among private insurers, but between private insurers with 
the public plan, and vice-versa. This puts pressure on all plans to operate more effectively 
and efficiently. 
 
To illustrate the potential of policies focused on better information, public health, 
improved incentives, and correcting price signals in the context of universal coverage, we 
modeled the Insurance Connector approach together with a subset of the options from the 
different strategic areas described. The options combined with coverage included: 
Promoting Health Information Technology; Center for Medical Effectiveness and Health 
Care Decision-Making; Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use and Public Health: 
Reducing Obesity; Episode-of-Care Payment; Strengthening Primary Care and Care 
Coordination; Competitive Bidding; and Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices. 
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POLICY OPTIONS: DESCRIPTION, ESTIMATES, AND DISCUSSION 
The sections that follow describe policy options analyzed in the report, present 
estimates of the potential effects, and discuss issues and consequences related to the policy 
change. For each option, we provide estimates of the effect on total system spending and 
the underlying net changes in spending by the federal government, state and local 
governments, private employers, and households over a 10-year period, as provided by 
the Lewin Group.33 
 
In a $2 trillion health sector that is expected to grow to over $4 trillion in the next 
decade, the analysis illustrates that even small incremental changes in total national 
expenditures add up to significant cumulative effects. Exhibits 6 and 7 summarize the 
cumulative results for all 15 options. The option sections provide detailed annual tables. 
 
The Challenge of Modeling the Future 
These estimates must be approached with caution, since they depend on the specifics of 
the proposals as modeled, how rapidly and how well they could be implemented, and the 
behavioral responses of key stakeholders. Given the limitations of modeling possible future 
interactions, the estimates tend to focus on first-round effects, rather than the potential 
dynamic gains from implementing individual policies or the synergies possible from 
combinations of policies. Because each policy is modeled in isolation, the potential gains 
to be had from a multifaceted approach to achieving more effective and efficient care are 
not addressed. 
 
The estimates draw on existing evidence regarding likely responses to policy 
changes relative to national projections of spending absent policy change. Where the 
effectiveness of a policy is particularly uncertain, the estimates use specific assumptions of 
the policy’s potential effectiveness. These assumptions represent reasonable professional 
judgments of the likely consequences of pursuing each option. 
 
Modeling the future with complex policy changes is inherently challenging and 
risky. The technical challenges include the uncertainty of estimating dynamic effects over 
time. Just as important, the estimates assume effective design and implementation, and 
therefore do not reflect the difficulty of achieving agreement, designing complex policy 
changes or the organizational adjustments required to implement them successfully. 
 
Yet, envisioning potential new policy directions is critical to the future health and 
economic security of the nation. The stakes are very high with enormous human and 
economic costs if we continue on the current path of escalating costs and eroding 
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coverage. Consequently, the Commission sponsored the options analyses to illustrate that 
it should be possible to achieve savings and improve value and to stimulate broader 
discussion and consensus regarding how to move the health care system on a path toward 
a high-value, high performance health care system. 
 
 
Exhibit 6. Policy Options and Net Cumulative Impact on 
National Health Expenditures over One, Five, and 10 Years 
  
One-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Cumulative 
Five-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Cumulative
10-Year 
Impact 
on NHE 
(billions) 
Producing and Using Better Information    
1. Promoting Health Information Technology $8 $14 –$88 
2. Center for Medical Effectiveness and 
Health Care Decision-Making –$18 –$125 –$368 
3. Patient Shared Decision-Making –$1 –$4 –$9 
Promoting Health and Disease Prevention    
4. Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use –$5 –$64 –$191 
5. Public Health: Reducing Obesity –$3 –$61 –$283 
6. Positive Incentives for Health $0 –$5 –$19 
Aligning Incentives with Quality and Efficiency    
7. Hospital Pay-for-Performance –$2 –$14 –$34 
8. Episode-of-Care Payment –$17 –$96 –$229 
9. Strengthening Primary Care and 
Care Coordination –$5 –$60 –$194 
10. Limit Federal Tax Exemptions for 
Premium Contributions –$10 –$55 –$131 
Correcting Price Signals in the Health Care Market    
11. Reset Benchmark Rates for 
Medicare Advantage Plans –$3 –$20 –$50 
12. Competitive Bidding  –$7 –$42 –$104 
13. Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices –$3 –$16 –$43 
14. All-Payer Provider Payment Methods and Rates $2 –$23 –$122 
15. Limit Payment Updates in High-Cost Areas –$4 –$43 –$158 
Note: A negative number indicates spending decreases compared with projected expenditures (i.e., savings); 
a positive indicates spending increases. 
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Exhibit 7. Policy Options and Distribution of 10-Year Impact on 
Spending Across Payer Groups (in billions) 
  
Total 
NHE† 
 
Federal 
Gov’t 
State/ 
Local 
Gov’t 
 
Private 
Payer 
 
 
Households 
Producing and Using 
Better Information 
     
1. Promoting Health 
Information Technology –$88 –$41 –$19 $0 –$27 
2. Center for Medical Effectiveness 
and Health Care Decision-Making –$368 –$114 –$49 –$98 –$107 
3. Patient Shared Decision-Making –$9 –$8 $0 $0 –$1 
Promoting Health and 
Disease Prevention      
4. Public Health: 
Reducing Tobacco Use  –$191 –$68 –$35 –$39 –$49 
5. Public Health: Reducing Obesity –$283 –$101 –$52 –$57 –$73 
6. Positive Incentives for Health –$19 $2 –$12 –$4 –$5 
Aligning Incentives with 
Quality and Efficiency      
7. Hospital Pay-for-Performance –$34 –$27 –$1 –$2 –$4 
8. Episode-of-Care Payment –$229 –$377 $18 $90 $40 
9. Strengthening Primary Care 
and Care Coordination –$194 –$157 –$4 –$9 –$23 
10. Limit Federal Tax Exemptions 
for Premium Contributions –$131 –$186 –$19 –$55 $130 
Correcting Price Signals 
in the Health Care Market      
11. Reset Benchmark Rates for 
Medicare Advantage Plans –$50 –$124 $0 $0 $74 
12. Competitive Bidding –$104 –$283 $0 $0 $178 
13. Negotiated Prescription 
Drug Prices –$43 –$72 $4 $17 $8 
14. All–Payer Provider Payment 
Methods and Rates –$122 $0 $0 –$105 –$18 
15. Limit Payment Updates in 
High-Cost Areas –$158 –$260 $13 $62 $27 
Note: A negative number indicates spending decreases compared with projected expenditures (i.e., savings); 
a positive indicates spending increases. 
† In some cases, because of rounding, the sum of the payer group impact does not add up to the national health 
expenditures total. 
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PROMOTING HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure 8.0 5.7 2.8 –0.1 –2.8 –9.9 –16.4 –20.9 –25.4 –28.8  13.6 –87.8 
Federal 
Government 2.3 1.4 0.3 –0.7 –1.8 –4.5 –7.0 –8.8 –10.7 –11.9  1.5 –41.4 
State and Local 
Government 0.4 0.1 –0.3 –0.7 –1.1 –2.1 –3.0 –3.7 –4.3 –4.4  –1.7 –19.3 
Private 
Employers 5.9 5.1 4.1 3.1 2.2 –0.3 –2.6 –4.2 –5.6 –7.7  20.5 0.2 
Households –0.6 –1.0 –1.4 –1.7 –2.1 –2.9 –3.7 –4.2 –4.7 –4.8  –6.8 –27.2 
 
 
Background 
Health information technology (HIT) has the potential to improve overall health system 
performance and reduce overall costs.34 Electronic medical records, when implemented 
along with process redesign efforts, can help physicians improve quality and reduce 
medical errors, while health information exchange can improve care coordination and 
reduce unnecessary tests. However, widespread adoption of health information technology 
has not occurred in the United States.35 One of the barriers to adoption is that in the 
current environment, while it is the providers who purchase HIT, the primary economic 
benefits accrue more directly to the payers.36 
 
Policy Proposal 
Under this policy, the federal government would levy a 1 percent tax on private insurance 
premiums and spend the equivalent of 1 percent of Medicare expenditures for HIT 
promotion activities. Those revenues would be divided between the Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) and the states. ONC 
would use the funds to strengthen federal efforts to promote HIT adoption, as well as to 
oversee federal matching programs for the states. The states would receive 3:1 federal 
matching funds to provide direct assistance (including capital assistance) to providers in the 
adoption of HIT technology, and 15:1 federal matching funds to promote the 
development of Health Information Exchange Networks (HIENs). Among providers 
receiving assistance, safety net and rural providers, as well as small practices, would be 
given high priority. Assistance programs would emphasize interoperability, clinical quality 
improvement functions, and performance measurement and reporting. 
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Estimated Effect 
This policy option results in cumulative net increases in national health expenditures of 
$13.6 billion over five years, but a 10-year cumulative net savings to national health 
expenditures of $87.8 billion as the initial investment yields returns (Exhibit 8). Over 10 
years, all payer groups experience net cumulative savings except for private payers. 
However, private payers realize a net annual gain beginning in year six (2013), and would 
have a net positive cumulative savings by year 11 (2018). In the analysis, the sources of 
savings from implementing provider HIT included reductions in rates of medical errors, 
more efficient use of diagnostic testing, more efficient drug utilization, and decreased 
provider costs (e.g., reduced transcription costs). Additional savings from the exchange of 
health information were due to better care coordination among multiple providers 
(reducing provider utilization) and better health outcomes through improved chronic-
disease management. 
 
Exhibit 8. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Promoting Health Information Technology
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Source: Based on estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund, 2007.  
 
Discussion 
This policy option represents a long-term investment in our health system. The estimates 
represent the additional net change expected from new investment resources, on top of a 
base that is already growing. Although there are short-term investment costs, there are 
long-term savings, gains in the quality and efficiency of health care, and improved patient 
health outcomes. Widespread adoption of HIT and health information exchange would 
also be synergistic with other policy options described in this report. For instance, the ready 
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availability of comparative effectiveness information would make it possible to disseminate 
revised practice recommendations much sooner. Enhancements to HIT would also be 
important as a foundation for the performance measurement framework required by public 
reporting as well as payment reform efforts. Thus, HIT could be instrumental in improving 
transparency and comparative information for both outcomes and associated costs. 
 
Relative to health information exchange, HIT adoption among individual 
providers is rising rapidly. Therefore, most spending under this option is on promoting 
health information exchange. This is a desirable consequence, as free-market mechanisms 
are unlikely to promote widespread adoption of health information exchange networks. 
Most existing and planned HIENs create a “public good,” and therefore have difficulty 
identifying a business case for their operations without external support. 
 
The length of time it takes to achieve a positive return on investment for this 
option, especially for private payers, will likely make implementation very difficult. In 
addition, the success of this option depends on the adoption of national interoperability 
standards and the ability to address patient privacy concerns. 
 
This policy option calls for a voluntary approach to promoting HIT adoption. An 
alternative approach would be to require providers, for instance, through Medicare’s 
conditions of participation, to implement electronic medical records (EMRs). A recent 
survey of health care opinion leaders supports such an approach.37 If payer assistance is not 
provided, the effect would be to shift the costs of adopting EMRs to the providers. 
However, external assistance would still likely be required for promoting health 
information exchange. 
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CENTER FOR MEDICAL EFFECTIVENESS 
AND HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –18.3 –21.2 –24.6 –28.3 –32.5 –37.0 –42.4 –47.9 –54.2 –61.2  –124.8 –367.5 
Federal 
Government –5.4 –6.3 –7.4 –8.5 –9.9 –11.4 –13.1 –15.0 –17.2 –19.4  –37.5 –113.6 
State and Local 
Government –2.5 –2.8 –3.3 –3.8 –4.3 –4.9 –5.7 –6.4 –7.3 –8.2  –16.6 –49.1 
Private 
Employers –5.0 –5.8 –6.7 –7.6 –8.7 –9.9 –11.3 –12.6 –14.2 –16.0  –33.7 –97.7 
Households –5.5 –6.3 –7.3 –8.4 –9.5 –10.8 –12.3 –13.8 –15.6 –17.6  –36.9 –107.1 
 
 
Background 
The rapid growth of health care spending in the U.S., combined with relatively poor 
performance, has led to calls for better decision-making and better evidence upon which 
to base it.38 Research has indicated that the dissemination of information in the form of 
patient education and the promulgation of clinical guidelines can produce cost savings in 
the health care system. Fisher and colleagues showed that practice patterns associated with 
greater utilization and spending do not systematically result in better health outcomes, and 
that reducing that variation in practice patterns could cut Medicare spending by 30 
percent.39 O’Connor and colleagues suggest that the implementation of patient-shared 
decision-making, in which patients are educated on all the treatment options, can reduce 
unwarranted variations in the use of invasive procedures and improve patient satisfaction.40 
While Anderson and colleagues found that 83 percent of health care expenditure in the 
U.S. is associated with the treatment of the chronically ill, McGlynn and colleagues found 
that chronically ill patients receive only 56 percent of the recommended care for their 
conditions.41 A mechanism for providing better information upon which to base medical 
decisions, as well as incentives encouraging more effective use of currently available 
information, would reduce unnecessary care, increase effective care, and improve the 
management of chronic conditions—thereby leading to lower health care costs in the long 
run while maintaining or improving health care quality and outcomes. 
 
Policy Option 
This option seeks to establish a Center for Medical Effectiveness and Health Care 
Decision-Making as a public/private partnership to improve decision-making by health 
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care providers, payers, and consumers. The Center would identify the information 
required to make better medical decisions, collect that information where it exists, and 
generate that information where it does not. It would make the information available to 
providers and patients for clinical care decisions, and encourage payers to use that 
information for coverage, payment, and health care determinations. 
 
The Center would operate as a quasi-governmental entity possessing legal 
characteristics of both the public and the private sector, so that it could receive funding 
(and participation and support) from both; it would be funded by contributions equal to 
0.05 percent of projected Medicare spending from the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust 
Fund, 0.05 percent of projected federal Medicaid spending from general revenues, and an 
assessment of 0.05 percent of private insurance premiums. The funding available for the 
Center in 2008 would be $0.8 billion, totaling $4.4 billion over five years and $10.5 
billion over 10 years. 
 
The Center would have a mandate to produce and publicize information that 
identifies and encourages the adoption of best practices and authority to establish certain 
incentives that are consistent with that objective. Specifically, under this option the 
Center would: 
 
• Provide targeted funding for research intended to evaluate existing and new devices, 
drugs, procedures and other treatment regimens that it identified as most important 
for improving the overall appropriateness of health care and health care spending; 
• Consistent with the findings produced by that research and other available 
information, require the use of patient decision aids in the evaluation of treatment 
options for selected procedures; and 
• Require increased copays for treatment options that it found to be inconsistent 
with appropriate management of chronic illness. 
 
Estimated Effect 
Under this policy option, the projected net savings to national health expenditures would 
be $18.3 billion in the first year, $124.8 billion over five years, and $367.5 billion over 10 
years (Exhibit 9). The largest estimated net reductions would be to federal spending 
($113.6 billion over 10 years), household spending ($107.1 billion over 10 years), and 
employers ($97.7 billion over 10 years). Smaller savings would accrue to state and local 
governments ($49.1 billion over 10 years). 
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Exhibit 9. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Center for Medical Effectiveness
and Health Care Decision-Making
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Discussion 
The savings estimated for this option are based on the use of the improved information 
produced by the Center to (1) increase screening and detection of certain conditions like 
hypertension and reduce invasive procedures like lower-back surgery, enhanced by the 
requirement to use patient decision aids, and (2) identify and apply more-appropriate 
treatment options for chronic conditions, enhanced by the requirement for higher cost-
sharing for services inconsistent with appropriate treatment. The availability of better 
information and changes in clinical decision-making that result from the establishment 
of the Center may by themselves produce savings in the long run, but the estimates 
here consider only the effects of the incentives that the Center would be empowered 
to implement. Improved and expanded information on clinical effectiveness would also 
enhance the value of public reporting and transparency regarding treatment choices 
and costs. 
 
As in other estimates presented in this volume, the distribution of savings across 
the various components of the health care system may be rebalanced by new policies. For 
example, the large savings in household insurance premiums would likely be shared in 
some way, so that they could benefit both insurance companies and their subscribers. 
Some of the savings from this mechanism might also be shared with the providers of 
health care, to provide additional encouragement for them to comply with the desired 
changes in practice and to offset some of the reduction in income that might result from 
the reduced utilization of some of the services that they otherwise would have provided. 
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PATIENT SHARED DECISION-MAKING 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9 –1.0 –1.1 –1.1 –1.3  –3.8 –9.2 
Federal 
Government –0.5 –0.6 –0.6 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9 –1.1  –3.1 –7.5 
State and Local 
Government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  –0.1 –0.2 
Private 
Employers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 0.0  –0.1 –0.4 
Households –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2  –0.5 –1.2 
 
 
Background 
The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (www.dartmouthatlas.org) has consistently demonstrated 
unwarranted variation in the use of medical resources across the United States. One source 
of this variation is “preference-sensitive care”—services for which at least two valid 
alternative treatment strategies are available. In theory, the choice should be based on an 
informed patient’s preference; in practice, it appears to be determined largely by local 
medical opinion.42 Engaging patients in shared decision-making is one approach to better 
aligning treatment strategies with patient preferences, and that process can be facilitated 
with patient decision aids (PtDAs). A review of the effect of PtDAs suggests that they can 
increase the use of cost-effective medical interventions, and can reduce the utilization of 
certain invasive procedures that patients do not value over less-invasive treatments.43 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) would require 
fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries to utilize a PtDA prior to having certain high-cost, 
preference-sensitive procedures, and in other situations where PtDAs have been shown to 
increase the use of cost-effective medical interventions. Initially, the procedures and 
conditions selected for this process could include: coronary revascularization for angina; 
mastectomy for early breast cancer; lumbar spine surgery for low-back pain; prostatectomy 
for benign prostatic hypertrophy; medical stroke prevention therapy; treatment of 
hypertension; tube feeding in dementia patients; routine colorectal cancer screening; 
routine prostate cancer screening; treatment of menorhaggia; and use of mechanical 
ventilation for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Additional procedures and 
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conditions would be added based on early program experience as well as emerging 
evidence regarding treatment alternatives to high-cost procedures. 
 
Providers who perform the selected procedures (e.g., lumbar spine surgery) or are 
accountable for the patient’s care (e.g., managing hypertension) would assume primary 
responsibility for ensuring that patients utilize PtDAs by collecting a signed attestation by 
the patient that he/she has utilized a PtDA. Providers who fail to obtain such attestation 
will be subject to a 10 percent reduction in Medicare reimbursement for claims related to 
the identified procedures and conditions for that patient. 
 
In order to support the delivery of patient decision aids, CMS would develop and 
maintain an interactive Web site of culturally sensitive and linguistically appropriate PtDAs 
for the selected conditions, and would also support regional nurse PtDA call centers for 
patients where the patient’s care team (e.g., the patient’s primary care practice) is not able 
to facilitate the PtDA use. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy option results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of 
$3.8 billion over five years, and $9.2 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 10). The savings are 
generated from both decreased utilization of expensive procedures (e.g., lumbar spine 
surgery) and increased use of cost-savings procedures, such as colorectal cancer screening. 
Since the savings are generated from changes in utilization, other payers, including 
households, who pay for care not covered by Medicare also experience savings. 
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Exhibit 10. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Patient Shared Decision-Making
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Source: Based on estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund, 2007.  
 
Discussion 
The estimated savings to national health expenditures are relatively modest, but the 
economic modeling was limited to treatment options for 11 conditions (chosen because of 
the available evidence of the impact on them of PtDAs) and applied only to Medicare 
beneficiaries. If Medicaid, private insurers, and other payers adopted this policy, its impact 
would be increased. It is anticipated that as more evidence is generated regarding cost-
effective treatment options, more procedures and conditions would be added to the 
program. However, to the extent that patient-shared decision-making enhances the 
“match” between treatment preferences and treatments actually received, this policy 
option increases the value of health care expenditures even if no savings are generated. In 
addition, considered in the context of broader efforts to promote greater patient 
engagement in health care, this option has minimal, if any, negative effects on the patient. 
There is an additional burden on providers, who would have the responsibility of ensuring 
that patients utilize a PtDA prior to receiving the treatments, but this could likely be 
integrated into the current process of obtaining informed consent. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH: REDUCING TOBACCO USE 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –4.5 –10.2 –13.4 –16.6 –19.6 –22.0 –24.0 –25.5 –26.3 –28.4  –64.3 –190.5 
Federal 
Government –1.6 –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –7.0 –7.9 –8.6 –9.1 –9.4 –10.2  –23.0 –68.2 
State and Local 
Government –0.8 –1.9 –2.5 –3.0 –3.6 –4.0 –4.4 –4.7 –4.8 –5.2  –11.8 –34.9 
Private 
Employers –0.9 –2.1 –2.7 –3.3 –4.0 –4.5 –4.8 –5.2 –5.3 –5.7  –13.0 –38.5 
Households –1.2 –2.7 –3.5 –4.2 –5.0 –5.6 –6.2 –6.5 –6.7 –7.3  –16.5 –48.9 
 
 
Background 
Cigarette smoking and other tobacco use is the biggest avoidable cause of disease and 
death in the United States. Not only is tobacco use associated with lung cancer and other 
respiratory illnesses, it also increases the risk of other cancers (oral cancers and pancreatic 
cancer, among others) as well as heart disease and stroke. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) has estimated that during the period 1997–2001, cigarette smoking 
was responsible for $167 billion in annual health-related economic losses in the United 
States ($75 billion in direct medical costs, and $92 billion in lost productivity).44 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy, the federal government would increase the federal excise tax on 
cigarettes from $.39 to $2.39, with a proportional increase in the taxes on other tobacco 
products. Revenues from this increase would be used to strengthen the CDC’s national 
tobacco control programs, as well as to give block grants to states for their own control 
programs. States would be eligible for such grants only if they met minimum tobacco 
control requirements, such as enacting legislation that bans smoking in enclosed workplaces 
and public spaces. 
 
Estimated Effect 
The economic effect of reduced tobacco use is a net reduction in national health 
expenditures (NHE) of $64.3 billion over 5 years and $190.5 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 
11). These result from a reduction in illnesses with tobacco use, though the savings decrease 
over time as the costs of age-related illnesses increase due to longer lives. Over 10 years, all 
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payers have a net savings. However, states’ savings from reduced health care expenditures 
are partially offset by reduced revenues from state tobacco taxes. 
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Exhibit 11. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Reducing Tobacco Use
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Source: Based on estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund, 2007.
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Discussion 
In addition to achieving savings, this policy option clearly increases the capacity of our 
health system to enable long, healthy, and productive lives. However, while the decrease 
in expenditures and improvement in population health represent an increase in overall 
health system efficiency, the policy would not directly improve individual provider 
efficiency. Also, although all payers would experience a net savings under this option, 
there would be a loss in state revenue from state cigarette taxes, estimated at $32.2 billion 
over 10 years. But to the extent that these revenues had been used for state tobacco 
control programs, that loss would be more than offset by the federal block grants for those 
programs to states under this option. However, some of those state tax revenues are 
currently being used for other programs. During implementation of this policy, 
consideration should be given to the impact of lost funding on those programs and 
potential mitigation strategies (e.g., temporarily allowing the block grants to support such 
programs). In addition, it is important to note that the proposed tax is substantial and 
regressive, and will disproportionately affect low-income consumers. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH: REDUCING OBESITY 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –3.4 –7.3 –11.7 –16.6 –22.2 –28.5 –35.6 –43.4 –52.1 –61.9  –61.1 –282.6 
Federal 
Government –1.2 –2.6 –4.2 –5.9 –8.0 –10.2 –12.7 –15.5 –18.7 –22.1  –21.9 –101.2 
State and Local 
Government –0.6 –1.3 –2.1 –3.0 –4.1 –5.2 –6.5 –8.0 –9.6 –11.3  –11.2 –51.8 
Private 
Employers –0.7 –1.5 –2.4 –3.4 –4.5 –5.8 –7.2 –8.8 –10.5 –12.5  –12.4 –57.2 
Households –0.9 –1.9 –3.0 –4.2 –5.7 –7.3 –9.1 –11.1 –13.3 –15.8  –15.6 –72.5 
 
 
Background 
Obesity is a significant risk factor for numerous illnesses such as high blood pressure, 
diabetes, and heart disease. Yet, data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey showed that the prevalence of obesity among adults more than doubled from the 
1970s to the 2000s.45 The share of national health expenditures attributed to obesity has 
been estimated at 5.5 to over 9 percent.46 Therefore, reductions in the prevalence of 
obesity should result in substantial savings to national health expenditures. 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy, the federal government would establish a new federal tax on sugar-
sweetened soft drinks at the retail level in the amount of $.01 per 12 ounces. Revenues 
from that tax would be reinvested in block grants to states for obesity prevention 
programs. States would be eligible for such grants only if they met minimum obesity 
control requirements such as the enactment of legislation banning the use of transfats in 
the preparation of food in restaurants; requiring restaurants that serve standardized food 
(e.g., at chain restaurants) to prominently display nutritional information; and requiring 
schools to ban the sale of sugar-sweetened soft drinks, enforce existing U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) regulations that prohibit serving school meals of minimal 
nutritional value, and serve meals consistent with USDA guidelines. 
 
Estimated Effect 
The economic effect of this policy is a net reduction in national health expenditures 
(NHE) of $61.1 billion over five years and $282.6 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 12). 
These savings accrue to all payer groups, and result from a reduction in illnesses associated 
with obesity, most notably cardiovascular disease and diabetes. Although consumers are 
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subjected to a new tax, it is offset by reductions in household insurance premiums and 
out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
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Source: Based on estimates by The Lewin Group for The Commonwealth Fund, 2007.  
 
Discussion 
In addition to achieving savings, this policy option increases the capacity of our health 
system to produce long, healthy, and productive lives. Although the decrease in expenditures 
and improvement in population health represent an increase in overall health system 
efficiency, the policy would not directly improve individual provider efficiency. And, while 
the new tax is regressive and disproportionately affects the lower-income population, the 
tax is not substantial and will likely not impose an economic hardship on consumers. It is 
important to note that the tax on sugar-sweetened soft drinks is just one example of a 
source of tax revenue for funding the proposed programs, and has been proposed by some 
states and professional societies. Alternatively, one could achieve a similar goal by assessing 
taxes on selected fast foods, candy, snacks, or other foods with minimal nutritional value. 
 
These estimates are based on the assumption that the policy slows the rise in the 
prevalence of obesity; a more aggressive assumption, in which the obesity trend is actually 
reversed, would yield a cumulative savings to national health expenditures of over $1.1 
trillion over 10 years. Both of these estimates, however, rely on the assumption that 
decreasing obesity reduces health care costs (even if providers increase utilization of other 
services to partially offset the loss from obesity-related illnesses). This is extrapolated from 
cross-sectional studies, but is subject to debate by health policy experts. 
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POSITIVE INCENTIVES FOR HEALTH 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –0.2 –0.6 –1.0 –1.5 –2.0 –2.2 –2.5 –2.7 –3.0 –3.2  –5.4 –19.0 
Federal 
Government 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0  1.9 2.2 
State and Local 
Government –0.6 –0.8 –0.9 –1.0 –1.1 –1.2 –1.3 –1.4 –1.5 –1.7  –4.4 –11.5 
Private 
Employers –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –0.6 –0.7 –0.7  –1.4 –4.5 
Households –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.6 –0.6 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.9  –1.6 –5.2 
 
 
Background 
Personal behavior, such as smoking, diet, and physical activity, has a direct impact on not 
only morbidity and mortality, but also on healthcare costs. It is estimated that 25 percent 
of all health care costs are related to modifiable health risks.47 Furthermore, there is 
evidence that health care costs can be controlled by promoting wellness and healthy 
behaviors to reduce overall health risk. At the patient level, a study by Edington and 
colleagues demonstrated that as an individual’s overall health risk decreases or increases, 
their medical claims costs decrease or increase accordingly.48 For patients who already 
suffer from a chronic illness, participation in disease management programs has the 
potential to improve quality and reduce costs. In response to the potential for savings in 
these areas, both private employers and state agencies are exploring the use of financial 
incentives and “value-based” benefit designs to encourage employees to participate in 
wellness programs, engage in healthy behaviors and obtain essential preventive care.49 
 
Policy Option 
The goal of this option is to encourage state and private employers to design benefits 
that create positive incentives for wellness and healthy behavior. The proposal has four 
separate components: 
 
• Provide a total of $50 million in federal grants to states to promote insurance 
benefit designs that incentivize healthy behaviors and participation in disease 
management programs through state contracting requirements, directly in 
state-sponsored or state-subsidized plans, or through modification of insurance 
rating rules. 
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• Increase the federal share of the premium for plans in the Federal Employee 
Health Benefit (FEHB) program that incentivize healthy behaviors. 
• Amend the tax code to allow employees to use Flexible Spending Accounts for 
specified programs to control weight and quit smoking. 
• Amend the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to 
mandate that all insurance plans exempt preventive services recommended by the 
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force from deductibles. 
 
Estimated Effect 
Under this policy option, the projected net cumulative savings to national health 
expenditures are $5.4 billion over five years, and $19.0 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 13). 
Most of the savings are derived from increased disease management participation in state 
Medicaid programs, as well as increased utilization of preventive services for patients 
covered under all payers. There is a net cost to the federal government of $1.9 billion over 
five years and $2.2 billion over 10 years because of the increased costs of the FEHB 
program and the grants to states, but all other payers experience savings from changes in 
utilization and improved health outcomes. 
 
Exhibit 13. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Positive Incentives for Health 
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Discussion 
Although the savings to national health expenditures are relatively modest, this policy 
option would improve health outcomes, so the efficiency of the U.S. health care system 
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would be improved even if the net savings were zero. The assumptions used in the 
modeling credited less than $1 billion in cumulative 10-year savings to decreases in obesity 
and smoking. If more aggressive benefit designs were used to address these two issues, 
more savings would be generated. 
 
However, a drawback of designing insurance benefit programs that reward healthy 
behavior is the potential negative impact it would have on vulnerable populations. For 
instance, low-income populations are more likely to live in communities with less access 
to healthy foods and fewer opportunities to engage in active lifestyles, so penalizing this 
population for obesity may be less fruitful than investing in community infrastructure to 
facilitate healthy living. 
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HOSPITAL PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –2.4 –2.6 –2.8 –3.0 –3.2 –3.4 –3.7 –4.0 –4.3 –4.6  –14.0 –34.0 
Federal 
Government –1.9 –2.1 –2.3 –2.4 –2.6 –2.8 –3.0 –3.2 –3.5 –3.7  –11.3 –27.4 
State and Local 
Government –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1  –0.3 –0.8 
Private 
Employers –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2  –0.7 –1.7 
Households –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 –0.6  –1.7 –4.1 
 
 
Background 
As the largest payer for health care, Medicare exerts substantial influence on the incentives 
for providers. The current fee-for-service system provides incentives for overutilization 
without regard to quality. Pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives can align incentives with 
the provision of high-quality care. P4P initiatives typically begin with the identification of 
quality measures, which by itself can enhance quality by highlighting to the provider 
community the processes and outcomes that Medicare wants to encourage. The 
establishment of financial rewards for the accomplishment of these processes and outcomes 
can help improve quality in two additional ways: it can help to remove or at least 
counteract aspects of the current payment system that are inconsistent with quality 
improvement (such as the incentive to increase volume of services inherent in fee-for-
service payment), and, more directly, it can reinforce actions that are consistent with high 
quality (such as the administration of aspirin to heart attack patients). 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy option, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will build 
on the experience of the CMS/Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration 
(HQID), under which more than 250 participating hospitals have been eligible to receive 
performance incentives since October 2003. This policy would expand the HQID pay-
for-performance program to all acute-care hospitals that are paid under the Medicare 
prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services and have a sufficient 
patient sample size for quality measurement. Funding for the bonuses paid under the 
program will be derived from reducing total base payments for all hospitals under PPS in 
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the coming payment year by an amount equal to the total projected bonus payments for 
discharges during that year. 
 
Although the clinical conditions and specific measures for which incentives are 
provided may change over time, the initial clinical conditions will be the same as those 
included in the current HQID: acute myocardial infarction (AMI), isolated coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG), heart failure (HF), community-acquired pneumonia (CAP), 
and hip and knee replacement surgery (Hip/Knee). The initial measures will be the 
measures for Year 4 of the HQID project.50 Other performance criteria—such as measures 
from the hospital version of the Consumer Assessment of Health Providers and Systems 
(H-CAHPS) Survey, which gauges patient experiences in the hospital—may be added in 
the future. 
 
Bonus payments will be based on three types of performance (modeled after, but 
not identical to, those currently being used in the HQID): 
 
• Top performance (relative threshold)—Hospitals that attain or exceed the 90th 
percentile composite quality score (CQS) for any clinical area will receive a 
2 percent bonus on their Medicare payments for discharges in that clinical area 
(hospitals that exceed the 80th percentile will receive a 1 percent bonus). 
• Absolute performance threshold—Hospitals that attain or exceed an absolute level 
of performance in any clinical area (as defined by the 75th percentile CQS among 
all eligible hospitals for the period two years prior to the payment year), regardless 
of the performance of other hospitals, will receive a 1 percent bonus on their 
Medicare payments for discharges in that clinical area. 
• Performance improvement—Hospitals that attain or exceed the 80th percentile 
CQS improvement ratio (the ratio of the CQS for the payment year to the CQS 
for the period two years prior to the payment year) in any clinical area among all 
eligible hospitals will receive a 1 percent bonus on their Medicare payments for 
discharges in that clinical area, if they attained or exceeded the 50th percentile CQS 
among all eligible hospitals for the period two years prior to the payment year. 
 
Hospitals that qualify for payment under more than one of the above bonus categories will 
receive all of the payments for which they qualify. Unlike the current HQID, there will 
be no potential decrease in Medicare payments for hospitals with poor performance. 
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Estimated Impact 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $14.0 
billion over five years, and $34.0 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 14). All payer groups 
experience net savings, but the major share of the savings accrue to the federal 
government through reductions in Medicare payments—predominately due to decreased 
readmissions for Medicare beneficiaries. Other payers that provide wraparound coverage 
to Medicare beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries themselves, also realize savings because of 
reduced hospital costs. 
 
Exhibit 14. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Hospital Pay-for-Performance
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Discussion 
This policy option reduces national health expenditures by improving the quality of 
hospital care. Although the bonus payments are made only by Medicare and the bulk of 
the savings are generated by a reduction in Medicare readmissions, the incentives provided 
through this policy apply to all hospital patients, because most of the measures are based on 
the total number of patients being treated for the target conditions at each hospital. If other 
payers adopt corresponding payment incentives, there is even greater potential for savings. 
 
This option focuses on pay-for-performance for inpatient hospital services only, 
because that is the type of service (except, perhaps, for services provided by Medicare 
Advantage plans) for which Medicare has the most widely accepted measures of quality 
and the most experience in rewarding performance. Inpatient hospital services, however, 
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account for only 42 percent of all spending under traditional Medicare.51 Therefore, the 
potential for additional savings and quality improvement may exist when Medicare is 
ready to expand the pay-for-performance approach to all providers and services; CMS is 
currently developing measures and payment mechanisms to be incorporated into the 
expansion, but there is currently no experience upon which to base estimates of their effect. 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that transparency of information on quality is 
essential for policies such as this one. The availability of a valid, publicly available database 
on provider performance enables payers to construct reward and other mechanisms to 
encourage the provision of high-quality care. 
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EPISODE-OF-CARE PAYMENT 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –17.4 –18.2 –19.1 –20.2 –21.5 –23.0 –24.5 –26.3 –28.3 –30.7  –96.4 –229.2 
Federal 
Government –28.7 –29.9 –31.4 –33.3 –35.4 –37.8 –40.4 –43.3 –46.6 –50.6  –158.7 –377.4 
State and Local 
Government 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5  7.7 18.3 
Private 
Employers 6.8 7.1 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.6 10.3 11.1 12.1  37.9 90.1 
Households 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.3  16.7 39.7 
 
 
Background 
The Medicare fee-for-service system rewards overutilization of resources, and does not 
incentivize efficient or coordinated care. A symptom of the current incentive misalignment 
is the wide variation in cost and quality across the U.S., as demonstrated by researchers at 
the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (www.dartmouthatlas.org). One alternative to fee-for-
service that would reward efficiency and care coordination is bundled payment systems—
for instance, making a single payment to cover the entire cost of the care (across providers 
and settings) of a patient during an episode of illness during a specified period.52 
Transitioning to episode-based payment and linking payment rates to performance 
benchmarks has the potential to reduce variation in performance and generate savings. 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy option, Medicare fee-for-service would transition to a payment system 
based on bundled payments for episodes of care. For acute-care episodes that involve 
hospitalization (e.g., hip replacement, acute myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass 
surgery), Medicare would prospectively pay a comprehensive bundled episode case rate 
by diagnosis-related group (DRG) that would cover all inpatient, physician, and related 
(e.g., home health) services traditionally covered under Medicare Parts A and B for care 
of the patient from the time of admission through a period post-hospitalization (in most 
cases, 90 days). Bundled case rates would also be developed for healthy and chronically ill 
beneficiaries in the ambulatory setting. 
 
The payment rates would be based on the 75th percentile of the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) with the lowest severity-adjusted Medicare resource cost nationally. 
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The rate could be adjusted based on performance measures of clinical quality and 
patient experience. 
 
Estimated Effect 
The estimated result of this policy option is a net cumulative savings to national health 
spending of $96.4 billion over five years and $229.2 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 15). 
Savings are generated by reductions in Medicare payments to providers. As a result of the 
decrease, providers both increase utilization and shift costs to other payers, as illustrated below. 
 
Exhibit 15. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Episode-of-Care Payment
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Discussion 
The proposed payment system would effectively align payment with efficiency. The 
bundled payment provides a substantial incentive for cost reduction, as the provider is at 
risk for all costs associated with the patient. Quality incentives are necessary to ensure that 
cost reduction does not result in substandard care. However, there are numerous barriers 
to implementation. One of the greatest challenges is identifying an entity to which the 
episode case rates should be paid. In the long term, payments could be made to integrated 
delivery systems or hospital-physician organizations, but in the short term the payments 
may have to be disaggregated for each provider. Another challenge is to apply severity 
adjustment appropriately to reduce preferential patient selection by providers while also 
reducing their exposure to insurance risk. 
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The estimate of savings to national health expenditures assumes that payers other 
than Medicare do not alter their payment methodology. If Medicaid and private payers 
followed CMS leadership in episode-based payment, the potential savings to national 
health expenditures would be greater. The change in payment method would put pressure 
on providers in high-cost geographic areas to deliver care more efficiently. 
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STRENGTHENING PRIMARY CARE AND CARE COORDINATION 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –4.5 –6.6 –11.2 –16.5 –21.1 –22.7 –24.6 –26.5 –28.7 –31.0  –60.0 –193.5 
Federal 
Government –3.6 –5.4 –9.1 –13.4 –17.1 –18.4 –19.9 –21.5 –23.3 –25.2  –48.6 –156.9 
State and Local 
Government –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6  –1.3 –4.1 
Private 
Employers –0.2 –0.3 –0.5 –0.8 –1.0 –1.1 –1.2 –1.2 –1.3 –1.4  –2.8 –9.1 
Households –0.5 –0.8 –1.4 –2.0 –2.6 –2.8 –3.0 –3.2 –3.4 –3.7  –7.3 –23.4 
 
 
Background 
There is substantial evidence that in areas where there is a greater role for primary care 
physicians in the delivery of medical care, the health outcomes are better and overall costs 
are lower.53 However, much of the services (e.g., care coordination, care management) 
and infrastructure (e.g., health information technology, advanced access) needed to deliver 
primary care effectively are reimbursed either inadequately or not at all in the current 
fee-for-service payment system. Some state Medicaid programs have successfully 
strengthened primary care, improved health outcomes, and reduced costs through Primary 
Care Case Management (PCCM) programs, which typically pay primary care physicians 
a per-member per-month fee for care management services in addition to usual fee-for-
service payments.54 
 
Policy Option 
Under this policy, beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service Medicare would be required 
to enroll in a medical home for primary care. These medical homes would offer enhanced 
primary care services such as care management, care coordination, patient education and 
advanced access (e.g., 24-hour coverage). They would have an information technology 
infrastructure to support clinical care and would generally deliver care using multidisciplinary 
teams. The medical homes would be responsible for coordinating all care for the beneficiary 
and authorizing specialty referrals. Physician practices that were certified as Medical 
Homes would receive a per-member per-month fee in addition to all currently covered 
fee-for-service payments. There may be additional quality- and efficiency-based incentives 
that would modify the fee. 
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Estimated Effect 
Under the policy option, the projected net cumulative savings to national health 
expenditures is $60.0 billion over five years and $193.5 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 16). 
Most of the savings are derived from a decrease in hospital and physician expenses as a 
result of higher-quality and more-efficient care delivered by medical homes. Since the 
savings are from changes in utilization, all payers providing wraparound coverage to 
Medicare beneficiaries accrue savings—including employer retiree plans and Medicaid. 
 
Exhibit 16. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Strengthening Primary Care and Care Coordination
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Discussion 
This policy option would have the benefit of both reducing expenditures and increasing 
health care quality and patient outcomes. It is a fundamental payment reform that is 
intended to strengthen and reward primary care. Two principal challenges to 
implementing this option are resistance from beneficiaries who would otherwise have less-
restricted access to specialty care, and a shortage of primary care physicians to staff medical 
homes. If one modified the option to have voluntary beneficiary enrollment with modest 
financial incentives, the net cumulative savings to national health expenditures would be 
reduced to $6.1 billion over five years and $31.7 billion over 10 years. If state Medicaid 
agencies also participated, enrolling 75 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries would result in 
an additional $16.8 billion in savings over five years, and $55.5 billion over 10 years. 
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LIMIT FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR PREMIUM CONTRIBUTIONS 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –9.5 –10.2 –10.9 –11.6 –12.5 –13.3 –14.2 –15.2 –16.2 –17.3  –54.7 –131.1 
Federal 
Government –13.5 –14.5 –15.5 –16.5 –17.7 –18.9 –20.2 –21.6 –23.1 –24.6  –77.7 –186.2 
State and Local 
Government –1.4 –1.5 –1.6 –1.7 –1.8 –2.0 –2.1 –2.2 –2.4 –2.6  –8.1 –19.3 
Private 
Employers –4.0 –4.3 –4.6 –4.9 –5.2 –5.6 –6.0 –6.4 –6.8 –7.3  –23.0 –55.2 
Households 9.4 10.1 10.8 11.5 12.3 13.2 14.1 15.1 16.1 17.2  54.1 129.7 
 
 
Background 
Employment-related group insurance is currently the primary source of coverage for the 
under-65 population, insuring two-thirds of working-age adults. Current federal tax laws 
promote and subsidize this coverage: employer-paid contributions for health insurance 
premiums are exempt from federal income taxes without regard to household annual 
income or the level of premium expenses.55 The tax exemption has helped support the 
pooling of health risks and group health insurance. Yet, at the same time, the tax subsidy 
for premiums can at the margin undermine incentives to select higher-value, lower-cost 
health plans. Equity is also a concern. Since few low-wage workers have job-based 
benefits, the current federal tax benefits from the exemption accrue primarily to middle- 
and upper-income workers. Consequently, various analysts have suggested examining 
possible options that would amend current tax exemptions to improve the efficiency and 
equity of federal tax expenditures. 
 
Policy Option 
To provide tax incentives for enrolling in high-value health plans (high-quality and 
efficient care), this policy option would set a cap on the amount of premiums that would 
be fully deductible. Premiums in excess of the threshold would be subject to federal 
income taxes. The cap would be set to 110 percent of the median employer-based 
premium for single or family policies. To avoid penalizing groups with older workers or 
those who live in high-cost-of-living areas, the limits would be increased for groups with 
a higher-than-average proportion of workers age 50 or older and would be regionally 
adjusted for wage and cost-of-living variations. Increased federal income tax revenues 
resulting from the limit would be earmarked for reinvestment in the health system to help 
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offset federal health spending, including efforts to improve coverage for those with low or 
modest incomes, improve public health, and invest in areas with the potential to improve 
quality and achieve national savings. 
 
Estimated Effect 
The Lewin modeling estimates that currently 22.5 million workers, or about 30 percent of 
all covered workers, have premiums in excess of the tax cap (Exhibit 17). The simulation 
estimates that most of this group (15 million) would move to less-expensive plans, 
including a shift out of primarily fee-for-service insurance into more-integrated health 
plans, reducing total health care spending. As modeled, the policy change would result in 
an estimated net savings to national expenditures of $55 billion over five years and $131 
billion over 10 years.56 Employers would also save as a result of lower premium payments. 
Households remaining in plans with premiums above the tax-deduction cap would pay 
federal income taxes on the excess amounting to an estimated $130 billion in federal tax 
revenues over 10 years, including income and Social Security taxes. 
 
Exhibit 17. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending from 
Limit on Federal Tax Exemptions for Premium Contributions
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Discussion 
Limiting the current federal exemption on health insurance premiums would provide 
incentives to enroll in plans that are less expensive. To the extent that this fosters the 
development of lower-cost health plans because of greater efficiencies in the delivery of 
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high-value care (e.g., through better organization of care delivery), the health system will 
move toward higher performance. 
 
However, there could be unintended consequences, especially if this option were 
to be implemented in health insurance markets that remained unchanged. In many regions 
of the country, there are limited options for high-value, integrated care systems. For 
employers and employees to avoid the premium tax-deduction cap, there would likely 
be a shift to higher-deductible/cost-sharing/limited-benefit plans. This shift would 
disproportionately affect low- and moderate-income families, as they are more price-
sensitive to exemption limits. Disparities in access to medical care would therefore 
increase, and would need to be addressed if this policy option were adopted. 
 
One other important issue to consider is that in current private insurance markets, 
particularly individual insurance and small-group markets, variations in premiums are in 
large part driven by age and health risks, rather than reflecting underlying efficiency or 
value. Absent broad pooling of health risks and full community rating, a tax-deduction cap 
seeking to promote equity and value would need to make adjustments for age, health, and 
cost of living, or require all states to institute market rules that require community rating. 
It would otherwise disproportionately affect older, sicker individuals and small firms 
residing in high-cost regions of the country. A further risk is that this approach could 
undermine employer group-risk pools. And, finally, the complexity of addressing these 
concerns through the tax system could lead employers, and especially small employers, to 
decide to drop coverage altogether. To avoid putting older, sicker, or lower-income 
patients at risk or undermining current employer group (pool risk) coverage, this change 
could be combined with universal coverage and changes in insurance market rules. 
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RESET BENCHMARK RATES FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –3.0 –3.5 –3.9 –4.3 –4.8 –5.2 –5.6 –6.0 –6.4 –6.9  –19.5 –49.6 
Federal 
Government –7.5 –8.8 –9.8 –10.9 –11.9 –12.9 –13.9 –15.0 –16.1 –17.3  –48.9 –124.0 
State and Local 
Government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Private 
Employers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Households 4.5 5.3 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.7 8.3 9.0 9.6 10.4  29.3 74.4 
 
 
Background 
Medicare beneficiaries have for the past 35 years had the option of enrolling in private 
plans to provide their health care benefits, in expectation that private plans would be able 
to provide more-coordinated care, be more flexible in responding to the needs of their 
enrollees, operate more efficiently, and provide examples of improvements that could be 
made to traditional Medicare. Currently, however, payments to private plans for enrollees 
under the Medicare Advantage (MA) program are estimated to be an average of 12 
percent higher than costs that would have been expected under traditional Medicare in 
2006.57 As a result, the current mechanism for setting the benchmark rates, which result in 
payments that are substantially higher than anticipated costs under traditional Medicare, 
sends a price signal through the market that encourages higher rather than lower costs 
among private plans. 
 
Originally, payments to Medicare private plans in each county under the Medicare 
risk program were set at 95 percent of the county’s Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost 
(AAPCC) in traditional Medicare. Beginning in 1998, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
(BBA) and subsequent legislation altered the mechanism for setting private plan payment 
rates and expanded the types of plans that could participate in Medicare. Since 2006, the 
payment rate for MA plans has been determined by the relationship between the bid 
submitted by the plan and the benchmark rate for the county, which is the highest of 
several amounts that are based on the old AAPCC rate trended forward, the nationwide 
average of the old AAPCC rates trended forward, minimum rates that apply to rural and 
small urban areas, respectively, and rates based on recent per capita costs under traditional 
Medicare. If the plan’s bid is below the benchmark, the plan receives a payment equal to 
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its bid plus a “rebate” equal to 75 percent of the difference between the benchmark and its 
bid. The plan is required to use the rebate amount to provide additional benefits, or 
reductions in premiums or cost-sharing. If the plan’s bid is above the benchmark, beneficiaries 
wishing to enroll in the plan have to pay a premium equal to the difference between the 
plan’s bid and the benchmark. 
 
Policy Option 
To correct pricing signals in health plan markets to encourage lower-cost plans, this 
proposal would modify the current payment methodology by setting the benchmark rate 
for MA plans in each county at the county’s projected per capita spending under 
traditional Medicare. As is the current policy, if a plan’s bid is below the benchmark, the 
plan receives a payment equal to its bid plus a rebate of 75 percent of the difference 
between its bid and the benchmark, and is required to use the rebate to provide additional 
benefits or reductions in premiums or cost-sharing. As is also current policy, if the plan’s 
bid is above the benchmark, beneficiaries wishing to enroll in the plan would have to pay 
a premium equal to the difference between the plan’s bid and the benchmark. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $19.5 billion 
over five years, and $49.6 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 18). While federal government 
spending is reduced by $124.0 billion as a result of the reduced payments to MA plans, 
Medicare beneficiaries’ spending rises by $74.4 billion, consisting of additional private 
premiums for those who attempt to replace some of the additional benefits that are available 
under the current MA payment rates, as well as extra payments required for those who 
choose to enroll in plans with bids that exceed the benchmark rate. 
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Exhibit 18. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Reset Benchmark Rates for Medicare Advantage Plans
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Discussion 
The net savings in national health expenditures produced by this option are the result of 
lower MA payments, driven by reduced benchmark rates: while the current MA benchmarks 
are explicitly set to be “no lower” than projected per capita spending under traditional 
Medicare, this policy option would set them equal to that amount. 
 
The estimated savings to the federal government, however, are partially offset by 
increased spending by Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in MA plans. MA enrollees 
currently receive cost-sharing reductions or additional benefits that are subsidized by the 
extra payments that plans receive from Medicare relative to what the enrollees would be 
expected to cost under traditional Medicare, but those extra payments would be eliminated 
under this option. In the model used to estimate the effect of this option, beneficiaries 
would tend to pay extra to replace some of the additional benefits they now receive, by 
purchasing supplemental benefits either through their MA plan or by enrolling in traditional 
Medicare and purchasing additional coverage through a separate private plan. 
 
One additional concern that has been raised about proposals to reduce MA plan 
payments is a possible recurrence of the withdrawal of private plans that occurred after 
those payments were reduced by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). Between 1999 
and 2002, following implementation of the BBA, the number of private plans participating 
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in Medicare fell from 407 to 240, and the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in 
private plans fell from 6.9 million to 5.5 million. 
 
The full potential effect of plan withdrawals and reduced enrollment is not 
reflected in this estimate. If a repeat of the post-BBA exodus were to occur, more 
beneficiaries would be faced with the loss of access to their current plans and the benefits 
they offer; the estimated savings to Medicare and to national health spending, however, 
would be larger than reflected in this estimate. 
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COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –6.8 –7.6 –8.3 –9.1 –9.8 –10.7 –11.5 –12.4 –13.4 –14.5  –41.7 –104.2 
Federal 
Government –19.0 –21.0 –22.8 –24.7 –26.7 –28.9 –31.1 –33.5 –36.0 –38.7  –114.3 –282.5 
State and Local 
Government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Private 
Employers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Households 12.2 13.4 14.5 15.6 16.9 18.2 19.6 21.0 22.6 24.3  72.6 178.3 
 
 
Background 
The payment received by MA plans for each enrollee is determined by the bid submitted 
by the plan and a benchmark rate for the county in which the enrollee resides. That 
benchmark rate is set at the highest of several amounts that are based on the old county-
specific average adjusted per capita cost (AAPCC) rate trended forward, the nationwide 
average of the old AAPCC rates trended forward, minimum rates that apply to rural and 
small urban areas, respectively, and rates based on recent per capita costs under traditional 
Medicare. If the plan’s bid is below the benchmark, the plan receives a payment equal to 
its bid plus a “rebate” equal to 75 percent of the difference between the benchmark and its 
bid. The plan is required to use the rebate amount to provide additional benefits, or 
premium or cost-sharing reductions. If the plan’s bid is above the benchmark, beneficiaries 
wishing to enroll in the plan have to pay a premium equal to the difference between the 
plan’s bid and the benchmark. The shift in payment methods has increased Medicare costs 
and, in some markets, undermined access to physicians in traditional Medicare as 
physicians withdraw and turn to private plans with increased payment rates. 
 
Policy Option 
This option would replace the current administered pricing mechanism in Medicare 
Advantage with increased competition on the basis of quality and efficiency. This policy 
change would modify the current payment methodology by basing the benchmark in each 
Medicare Advantage region on the average bid of the plans in the region, rather than on 
the highest of a set of predetermined rates.58 If the average bid in a region is higher than 
the nationwide projected per capita cost under traditional Medicare, then the benchmark 
rate for the region would be set to that nationwide average. 
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If a plan’s bid is equal to or below the benchmark, beneficiaries wishing to enroll 
in that plan would be able to do so at no extra cost (over and above their Part B 
premium), with the savings accruing to the federal government. If a plan’s bid is above the 
benchmark, beneficiaries wishing to enroll in that plan would have to pay a premium 
equal to the difference between the plan’s bid and the benchmark. 
 
The local projected per capita cost under traditional Medicare for the county in 
which a beneficiary resides is considered equivalent to traditional Medicare’s “bid”; 
therefore, if that amount is greater than the benchmark for the region, the beneficiary will 
have to pay an additional premium (equal to the difference between that “bid” and the 
benchmark) to remain in traditional Medicare. There also may be instances in which 
beneficiaries will have to pay more to enroll in an MA plan than to stay in traditional 
Medicare; this will occur if the traditional Medicare “bid” is less than or equal to the 
benchmark but the plan’s bid is above the benchmark. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $41.7 
billion over five years, and $104.2 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 19). While federal 
government spending is reduced by $282.5 billion as a result of the reduced payments to 
MA plans, Medicare beneficiaries’ spending rises by $178.3 billion, consisting of the extra 
payments required for those who choose to enroll in plans with high bids—including some 
who choose to remain in traditional Medicare, even when that requires them to pay an 
additional premium—and additional private premiums for those who attempt to replace 
some of the additional benefits that are available under the current MA payment rates. 
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Exhibit 19. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Competitive Bidding
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Discussion 
The net savings to the health care system produced by this option have two distinct 
components: substantial savings to the Medicare program resulting from sharp declines in 
payment rates to private plans from their current level at 12 percent above the traditional 
Medicare costs; and a somewhat smaller, but still large, increase in spending by 
beneficiaries, as their plan choices require them to make additional payments if they want 
to stay in high-cost plans or in traditional Medicare (where it is high-cost relative to the 
available private plans), or if they want to replace lost benefits that their plans used to 
provide, but no longer do. 
 
Because there is a net reduction in overall health spending, alternative policies 
could be built into the bidding process to soften the impact on beneficiaries. For example, 
beneficiaries who enroll in plans with bids that are below the benchmark could receive a 
rebate equal to some or all of the difference between the plan’s bid and the benchmark; 
this policy would provide a stronger incentive for beneficiaries to enroll in low-cost plans, 
and would allow them to replace some of the extra benefits that would no longer be 
available in most of those plans. Alternatively, plans with bids that are below the benchmark 
could continue to be required to provide extra benefits; this policy would reduce the total 
amount of system savings, but would also soften the financial impact on beneficiaries 
at least those who enroll in low-cost plans.59 This option would have to be designed 
carefully to avoid drawing healthier beneficiaries away from Medicare and to avoid 
putting at risk elderly and disabled beneficiaries, as well as those with modest incomes. 
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NEGOTIATED PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –2.5 –2.9 –3.1 –3.7 –3.5 –4.3 –4.8 –5.3 –6.5 –6.8  –15.8 –43.4 
Federal 
Government –4.1 –4.7 –5.2 –6.2 –5.8 –7.0 –7.9 –8.8 –10.7 –11.1  –26.0 –71.5 
State and Local 
Government 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5  1.3 3.5 
Private 
Employers 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.7  6.2 17.1 
Households 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2  2.7 7.5 
 
 
Background 
Section 1860D-11 of the Social Security Act, enacted in the Medicare Modernization Act 
of 2003 (MMA), states that the Secretary of Health and Human Services “may not 
interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP 
(Medicare prescription drug plan) sponsors” and “may not require a particular formulary 
or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered Part D drugs.” 
 
Under current law, therefore, the drugs available to enrollees in each drug plan 
under Medicare Part D are determined by the formulary set by the plan (subject to certain 
minimum requirements for inclusion), and the price paid by the plan for each drug is 
subject to negotiation between the plan and the drug manufacturer or distributor. This 
provision has been controversial since it was enacted, with proponents arguing that it 
avoids government price-setting and allows the competitive market to function to the 
benefit of all parties involved, and opponents arguing that Part D plans (and therefore both 
Medicare and its beneficiaries) pay higher prices than they should, given the tremendous 
share of the pharmaceutical market represented by Medicare beneficiaries. 
 
Policy Option 
This option would give the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to 
negotiate drug prices for prescription drug plan enrollees. The rationale for this authority 
is that the Secretary would have greater leverage than the plan’s pharmacy benefit 
managers do to negotiate greater discounts from drug manufacturers, and costs to 
Medicare would consequently be reduced. 
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There are three specific mechanisms under this option for achieving the reduction 
in drug costs paid by Part D. The first is a mandate that Part D pay the Medicaid rate for 
prescription drugs for dual eligibles; Frank and Newhouse showed that Medicare is paying 
a higher rate under Part D for drugs used by dual-eligible beneficiaries than Medicaid pays 
for the same drugs.60 The second, proposed by Frank and Newhouse, is that the Secretary 
administratively set the price for unique drugs. The third mechanism under this option 
calls for the Secretary to establish a purchasing collaborative of all public payers. Large 
employers and multi-employer purchasing groups could participate on a voluntary basis. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $15.8 
billion over five years, and $43.4 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 20). The major beneficiary 
of this policy would be the federal government, which would experience savings of 
$71.5 billion over 10 years, while state and local governments, private employers, and 
households all would experience slight increases in spending over that period. 
 
Exhibit 20. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices
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Discussion 
The bulk of the savings under this option would result from paying Medicaid rates for 
prescription drugs used by dual eligibles under Part D; this provision would reduce Part D 
spending by $57.5 billion over 10 years. The additional spending for state and local 
governments, private employers, and households, as well as some increased spending in 
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other federal government programs, would result primarily from an increase in drug prices 
to other payers in response to the decrease in payments for dual eligibles’ drugs. 
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that modifying the 
provision that prohibits the Secretary from interfering in drug price negotiations would 
have a negligible effect on federal spending without the authority to establish a formulary 
and without other tools to reduce drug prices.61 While this proposal does not include 
formulary provisions, it can achieve savings from administered prices for dual eligibles 
under Part D. Additional savings could be generated if broader tools were included in the 
proposal. For instance, the Government Accountability Office found that governments 
in other countries use a range of approaches to limit the amount they pay to acquire drugs, 
including establishing ceiling prices and negotiating prices directly with drug manufacturers, 
establishing reference prices for drugs that are therapeutically similar, and limiting profits 
that can be earned by drug manufacturers in a given period of time.62 Careful consideration 
would have to be given to the impact this option might have on innovation in the 
development of effective new drugs. 
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ALL-PAYER PROVIDER PAYMENT METHODS AND RATES 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure 1.4 –1.4 –4.9 –8.1 –10.1 –13.8 –17.6 –20.2 –22.3 –25.4  –23.1 –122.4 
Federal 
Government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
State and Local 
Government 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Private Payers 1.3 –1.4 –4.3 –6.9 –8.8 –12.1 –15.2 –17.2 –18.8 –21.3  –20.1 –104.7 
Households 0.1 0.0 –0.6 –1.1 –1.3 –1.7 –2.4 –3.0 –3.5 –4.1  –2.9 –17.7 
 
 
Background 
The health care system historically has been characterized by cross-subsidies among 
different payers for most health care services. One factor in the evolution of these cross-
subsidies is the large number of patients who lack insurance and therefore can offer no 
direct payment to providers to offset the cost of the care they use; another is the tendency 
of Medicaid programs to pay for their beneficiaries’ care at rates that are below providers’ 
average costs. Medicare historically has paid at rates that correspond more closely to 
average cost, but those rates have varied somewhat, and—particularly for physician 
services under the current sustainable growth rate mechanism—are placing increasing 
pressure on providers to make up from other sources for absolute or at least relative 
shortfalls in Medicare revenue. The costs of uninsured, Medicaid, and to some extent 
Medicare patients traditionally have been offset by payments from private insurers that 
consistently have exceeded the costs of treating their beneficiaries. 
 
These tacit cross-subsidies have contributed to the steady rise in health care costs. 
Negotiations between payers and providers based on efficiency (quality and costs) are 
distorted by the absence of a clearly defined relationship between the costs and the prices 
of health services. Moreover, when individual payers do attempt to control provider costs 
by limiting their willingness to underwrite continued cost increases, providers have been 
able to find other payers from which they are able to extract additional payments to 
support those cost increases—negating the effects of those cost-dampening efforts. 
 
Policy Option 
This option would address the fragmented system under which providers must deal with 
numerous payment mechanisms, rates, and reporting rules. Under this option, all payers 
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(except those who make capitated payments to providers) would be required to adopt 
payment rates and methods like Medicare’s for hospitals and physicians, and payment rates 
for all payers for each type of provider would be posted and publicly accessible. A federal 
requirement would be established for all hospitals and physicians participating in Medicare 
that uninsured patients may initially be charged no more than the lowest rate of 
reimbursement paid by any public or private group insurance payer for similar services 
received, and balance billing would be prohibited. 
 
Medicare payment rates for hospitals and physicians (and the maximum charge for 
uninsured patients) would be updated by a mechanism that is based on price change data 
for each type of provider (the Medicare Hospital Market Basket Index for hospitals and 
the Medicare Economic Index for physicians), adjusted for annual increases in productivity 
and the decreases in per-unit costs that result from increased volume; there also would be 
differential adjustment to payment rates to gradually eliminate the discrepancy in payment 
rates across payers. 
 
Differential updates would be implemented as follows: each year, payment rates for 
private payers would be updated by an amount equal to 1 percentage point less than the 
Medicare update in that year, until the discrepancy between (case-mix adjusted) payment 
rates for private payers and Medicare is eliminated; each year, payment rates for each state 
Medicaid program would be updated by an amount equal to 1 percentage point more 
than the Medicare update in that year, until the discrepancy between (case-mix adjusted) 
payment rates for Medicaid and Medicare is eliminated. 
 
A supplemental reimbursement pool would be created by an assessment on private 
insurance premiums equal to one-half of the percentage differential between their 
payment rates under the reduced update (Medicare update minus 1 percentage point) and 
what their payment rates would have been if their payment rates had been updated since 
the first year at the Medicare update. This pool would be used to compensate the states 
and the federal government for the shares of the additional Medicaid payments they are 
required to make. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $23.1 
billion over five years, and $122.4 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 21). The most direct 
beneficiary of this option—despite the new assessment that is used to subsidize increased 
Medicaid payment rates—is the private insurance industry, which consistently has paid 
more to providers than its patients have cost to treat, subsidizing the uncompensated costs 
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of providing care to uninsured patients and the low rates paid by Medicaid and other 
public programs in many states. The benefits to households in this estimate reflect the 
impact of lower premiums resulting from the lower payment rates that private payers will 
be required to pay. It is worth noting that the net impact on both the federal and the state 
budgets is zero, with the subsidies provided from the assessment on private payers 
offsetting the increased costs of higher Medicaid payment rates. 
 
Exhibit 21. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from All-Payer Provider Payment Methods and Rates
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Discussion 
This option will produce some effects not reflected in the estimates presented above. Even 
after the new assessment on private insurers is used to completely offset the additional costs 
to the states and the federal government, there remains an unallocated amount ($34.1 
billion). This amount could be used to accomplish several objectives, including (perhaps 
with an additional assessment on private insurers) creation of an uncompensated care pool 
to subsidize hospitals for the treatment of uninsured patients—the cost of which is not 
directly affected in the option as modeled. Alternatively, the pool could be used to fund 
other improvements in health system performance. 
 
As is the case in most scenarios that address reductions in national health 
expenditures, the reduction in spending under this option corresponds to a reduction in 
incomes for some groups—usually some or all providers. In this case, hospitals and 
physicians receive higher payments from Medicaid, but that increase does not offset a 
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decrease in the payments they receive from private insurers. Moreover, the distribution of 
the increase in Medicaid payments does not necessarily match the distribution of the 
decline in private payments across providers; rather, it favors providers who treat more 
Medicaid patients (for which payments rise under this option), which may be a more 
equitable outcome, but does not address the decreases in revenue faced by providers who 
may treat more uncompensated care patients (for which they do not receive additional 
payment under this option as modeled). That consideration may further argue for a 
modification of this policy (again, supplemented perhaps by an increased assessment on 
private insurers—since they realize net savings of more than $100 billion on the option as 
modeled) to create an uncompensated care pool or to help underwrite other initiatives to 
make insurance more affordable.63 To avoid undermining safety net providers, it would be 
necessary to use some of the savings either to bolster uncompensated care pools or to 
finance coverage expansions. 
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LIMIT PAYMENT UPDATES IN HIGH-COST AREAS 
Annual Net Impact  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –3.7 –6.1 –8.5 –11.0 –13.8 –16.8 –19.7 –22.8 –26.0 –29.3  –43.1 –157.8 
Federal 
Government –6.1 –10.1 –13.9 –18.1 –22.7 –27.6 –32.5 –37.5 –42.9 –48.3  –70.9 –259.7 
State and Local 
Government 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3  3.4 12.6 
Private 
Employers 1.5 2.4 3.3 4.3 5.4 6.6 7.8 9.0 10.2 11.5  16.9 62.1 
Households 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.5 5.1  7.5 27.3 
 
 
Background 
The growth in Medicare spending has been and continues to be a concern, accounting for 
3.1 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006—more than double the 
share of GDP that it represented 25 years earlier.64 Over the past two decades, Medicare 
has shifted from reimbursement based on each provider’s costs or charges to an array of 
payment systems that provide a fixed payment for each unit of service; the two major 
examples of these new payment systems are the prospective payment system (PPS) for 
inpatient hospital services and the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) for 
physician services. Since the implementation of these systems, Medicare spending growth 
has slowed somewhat, but it continues to exceed GDP growth, and is projected to rise to 
6.5 percent of GDP by 2030. 
 
One of the objectives of both the PPS and the RBRVS was to reward efficient 
providers by providing a payment for each service roughly based on the average costs of 
providing the service. High-cost providers would therefore face an incentive to reduce 
their costs below the payment rate while low-cost providers would benefit by retaining 
the difference between their payment rates and their costs. However, for both hospital and 
physician services, the overall costs incurred by Medicare depend not only on the payment 
rate per service, but also on the number of services provided to each patient over the 
episode of illness—which can vary considerably across geographic areas.65 
 
Despite this geographic variation, the updates to both hospital payment rates and 
physician fees, which are designed to reflect annual increases in the costs of efficiently 
producing health care, are applied nationally; they are not affected by differences in the 
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level of costs per beneficiary in each area. The same update is applied in Miami, Florida—
where Medicare spending per beneficiary was $11,352 in 2003—and Salem, Oregon—where 
Medicare spending per beneficiary was $4,273 in the same year.66 
 
Policy Option 
This option would focus pressure on high-cost regions to avoid across-the-board 
adjustments or constraints that would penalize low- as well as high-cost regions. This 
policy change would adjust the updates to both hospital payment rates and physician fees 
in each area (defined for this purpose as a metropolitan area or the combined rural areas in 
each state) to reflect the level of total Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary 
in that area, relative to the national average. 
 
The basic updates for hospital and physician services would be based on the 
projected increases in the Medicare Hospital Market Basket Index (MBI) and the 
Medicare Economic Index (MEI), respectively, which reflect the nationwide costs of 
inputs used in providing those services. The area-level adjustment to the basic updates 
would be as follows. 
 
• For areas with Medicare Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary greater than 
the 75th percentile of the distribution across all areas (weighted by the number of 
Medicare beneficiaries residing in each area): no update. 
• For areas with spending per beneficiary between the 50th and 75th percentiles: 
a sliding scale from 0 percent to 100 percent of the basic update described above, 
depending on the ratio of combined Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary 
in the area to the median combined Part A and Part B spending per beneficiary 
across all areas. 
• For areas with spending per beneficiary at or below the 50th percentile: the full 
basic update. 
 
For purposes of this mechanism, certain primary care and preventive services (such as 
evaluation and management services and the administration of pneumococcal vaccine) 
would not be included in calculating Part A and Part B spending when determining the 
update formula. 
 
Estimated Effect 
This policy results in an estimated net savings to national health expenditures of $43.1 
billion over five years, and $157.8 billion over 10 years (Exhibit 22). As would be 
expected, the federal government is the primary beneficiary of this option, with Medicare 
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savings of $262.9 billion over 10 years, offset only slightly by an increase in costs to other 
federal programs of $3.2 billion due to increases in the volume of services provided by 
hospitals and physicians in the high-cost areas in which the Medicare payment updates are 
reduced. State and local governments, private employers, and households similarly 
experience small spending increases in the option as modeled, due to increases in service 
volume in response to reduced payment updates in high-cost areas. 
 
Exhibit 22. Distribution of 10-Year Impact on Spending
from Limit on Payment Updates in High-Cost Areas
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Discussion 
This option was modeled with basic updates for hospital and physician services determined 
by annual increases in the MBI and the MEI, respectively. Although that assumption 
reflects the actual experience with hospital payments in recent years, it reflects neither the 
recent experience with physician fees nor projections for the near future. Since 1991, the 
annual update in physician fees has been adjusted to reflect the nationwide growth in the 
volume and intensity of services and total spending relative to a target.67 However, despite 
this attempt to offset the incentive to provide more—and more complicated—services, 
physician spending has grown faster than intended. As a result, physician fees have been 
subject to cuts in every year since 2002, although Congress has intervened in almost every 
case to avoid those cuts. Meanwhile, it has left the current mechanism in place, because 
replacing it would remove any nominal mechanism for controlling volume and intensity, 
and because the elimination of the projected future cuts that are built into the budget 
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baseline would increase spending counted against the budget deficit by hundreds of 
billions of dollars over the next decade. 
 
Because the current mechanism is not sustainable in the long run—and because it 
is difficult to project whether and to what extent Congress may intervene in the future to 
prevent large decreases in physician fees—this option has been modeled on an alternative 
update mechanism for physician fees similar to that recommended by the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission for the past several years.68 It should be noted, however, 
that because the current mechanism updates physician fees uniformly across the country, 
the adjustment of the update to reflect geographic differences in spending might be 
expected to have a similar effect. However, unless they followed Medicare’s lead, other 
payers could see higher costs from cost-shifting. 
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COMBINING SAVINGS OPTIONS WITH AFFORDABLE HEALTH 
INSURANCE FOR ALL 
Universal participation, with insurance that provides access and financial protection, is 
essential for a high performance health system.69 The opportunity to receive high-quality 
care begins with and depends on access. If designed well, universal coverage also can 
provide a foundation for improving quality and achieving short- and longer-term savings. 
 
Having a large segment of the U.S. population uninsured or intermittently insured 
contributes to the high costs of health care and undermines quality, outcomes, and the 
health of the population. Our fragmented insurance system, with multiple reporting, 
paperwork, and payment systems, as well as costs associated with churning in and out of 
coverage, drives up premium costs and also administrative costs for physicians, hospitals, 
and other components of the health care delivery system.70 
 
Under the current fragmented U.S. insurance system, it is also difficult to craft an 
integrated approach to changing incentives so that they reward rather than discourage 
improved health care and lower costs. Although Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
insurance plans can innovate, each accounts for only a share of health care markets and 
therefore can only partially influence how well those markets work. Thus, in addition to 
improving access and financial protection, efforts to secure affordable health insurance for 
all—if they are designed to enable more coherent, integrated, and efficient pricing and 
payment policies—have the potential to achieve overall health systems savings. 
 
Background 
Currently, the U.S. population is insured through a complex mix of public programs and 
private insurance plans that leaves an estimated 47 million uninsured and millions more 
underinsured.71 Affordability is a central concern for low- and modest-income individuals 
and families. While Medicaid and state children’s health insurance programs (SCHIP) are 
available for children in low-income families, Medicaid is not available for poor or 
modest-income adults under age 65, except in a few states.72 
 
The current mix of private insurance is expensive to administer, particularly in 
small-group and individual insurance markets. The net administrative costs of health 
insurance have more than doubled over the past 10 years—rising much faster than total 
national health expenditures. These overhead costs currently amount to 7.3 percent of 
national health expenditures, or more than $400 per person—two to three times levels in 
other countries. These higher overhead costs reflect more complex, fragmented insurance 
arrangements characterized by frequent changes in coverage. 
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In 2004, if the U.S. had been able to lower the share of health care spending on 
insurance overhead to the same level found in the three countries with the lowest rates, it 
would have saved $97 billion a year.73 If the U.S. had matched the insurance 
administrative spending of other countries with mixed public/private insurance systems 
such as Germany and Switzerland, it could have saved $32 billion to $46 billion a year. 
These cost differentials do not take into account the administrative costs within physician 
practices or hospitals. 
 
Between 2000 and 2005, the net insurance administrative overhead—including 
both administrative expenses and insurance industry profits—increased by 12.0 percent per 
year, 3.4 percentage points faster than overall average health expenditure growth.74 As 
illustrated in Exhibit 23, the cumulative increase in net private insurance administrative 
costs has outstripped premiums and national health expenditures, and far exceeds the 
increase in average labor costs. 
 
Exhibit 23. Cumulative Changes in Annual
National Health Expenditures, 2000–2007
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The current insurance system also operates with widely varying payment rates for 
the same care, depending on the insurance held by the patient. Rate differentials provide 
incentives and opportunities to “shift” costs by setting prices higher for those with less 
ability to negotiate market rates. Private insurance payment rates average 20 percent above 
Medicare rates for physicians, particularly for specialists, and 35 percent higher for 
hospitals; meanwhile, Medicaid payment rates average 30 percent below Medicare rates 
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for physicians and 2 percent lower for hospitals.75 As a result, it is difficult to develop a 
coherent set of incentives to align payment and policies to improve performance. 
Moreover, low Medicaid rates put beneficiaries at risk, since lower reimbursement rates 
make it more difficult to establish adequate provider networks. 
 
To examine the potential of a bundled approach that combines individual options 
for achieving savings within a context of affordable coverage for all, we used a policy 
proposal intended to expand affordable coverage through a blend of private and public 
group health insurance. As are the individual options described previously in this report, 
this scenario is presented as one of a range of proposals aimed at accomplishing its 
intended objective. We refer to it as the Insurance Connector approach. 
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COMBINING OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE SAVINGS 
WITH THE INSURANCE CONNECTOR APPROACH 
 Annual Net Impact: Insurance Connector Approach Plus Savings Options*  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure –$30.8 –$53.3 –$79.2 –$108.3 –$135.7 –$165.8 –$196.6 –$227.3 –$261.0 –$296.0  –$407.3 –$1,554.0 
Federal 
Government $31.3 $27.4 $22.5 $16.6 $13.2 $10.9 $9.1 $8.6 $8.1 $9.9  $111.0 $157.6 
State and Local 
Government –$14.3 –$18.6 –$23.3 –$28.6 –$34.0 –$39.9 –$45.8 –$51.8 –$58.4 –$65.1  –$118.8 –$379.8 
Private 
Employers $23.5 $20.6 $17.5 $14.1 $10.9 $6.3 $1.6 –$2.6 –$7.1 –$12.4  $86.6 $72.4 
Households –$71.4 –$82.8 –$95.7 –$110.3 –$125.9 –$143.3 –$161.6 –$181.5 –$203.7 –$228.1  –$486.1 –$1,404.3 
* In some cases, because of rounding, the sum of the payer group impact does not add up to the national health expenditures total. Options include: 
Promoting Health Information Technology; Center for Medical Effectiveness; Public Health: Tobacco Use and Obesity; Episode of Care Payment; 
Strengthening Primary Care and Care Coordination; Benchmark Rates for Medicare Plans, and Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices. 
 
The insurance scenario used in this analysis follows the design principles in the 
Commission report, Roadmap to Insurance for All: Principles for Reform. The Lewin Group 
first modeled estimated spending under the Insurance Connector scenario. Lewin then 
estimated the net effect if that scenario were combined with policy changes intended to 
encourage the production and use of better information, promote health and prevent 
disease, align incentives with quality and efficiency, and correct price signals in the health 
care market. The specifications used to develop these estimates were as follows: 
 
• The Insurance Connector Approach: Mixed Private–Public Group Coverage 
This insurance scenario includes creation of a new, national “Insurance 
Connector” that builds on and links current private and public group insurance by 
offering a structured choice of private health plans and Medicare. This option 
would be available to all individuals lacking access to group coverage and to small 
firms with fewer than 100 employees. The Medicare option would use current 
Medicare provider payment rates and fiscal claims intermediaries, and would offer 
an enhanced benefit package to avoid the need for supplemental coverage. The 
Connector would also offer a choice of private, integrated health plans. All plans 
sponsored through the Connector, including Medicare and alternative private 
plans, would be offered at adjusted community rates.76 
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To ensure that coverage is affordable, the insurance option would include 
premium assistance related to income and would make Medicaid available for any 
household with an income at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level. 
To equalize and integrate Medicare and Medicaid payment policies, Medicaid 
payment rates would be increased to Medicare levels. To achieve near-universal 
and affordable coverage, enrollment in some plan would be required, with 
automatic enrollment through the tax system. Appendix A provides further details 
of specifications used for modeling the Insurance Connector approach. 
 
• Savings Options Combined with the Insurance Connector Approach 
To illustrate the potential of a multifaceted approach, we examined the first-order 
savings effects of what might happen if the Insurance Connector approach were 
combined with options that focused on achieving savings and enhancing value. 
From the options described above, we selected a subset most likely to be mutually 
supporting. The savings from this subset also do not “overlap”—that is, we 
avoided cases in which there would be double-counting of savings. 
 
The options selected include: 
 
• Promoting Health Information Technology 
• Center for Medical Effectiveness and Health Care Decision-Making 
• Public Health: Reducing Tobacco Use 
• Public Health: Reducing Obesity 
• Episode-of-Care (for episodes involving acute hospitalizations only) 
• Strengthening Primary Care and Care Coordination 
• Reset Benchmark Rates for Medicare Advantage Plans 
• Negotiated Prescription Drug Prices 
 
In the context of the Insurance Connector, the payment options that apply 
specifically to Medicare would apply to a larger share of the population. Lewin thus 
adjusted the estimates and computed the additive effect of a combination approach. 
 
It is important to note that the modeling here does not account for possible 
synergistic effects of the individual options or of the individual options with the 
availability of coverage for all. For example, clinical, coverage, and payment 
decisions in an environment with both widespread HIT and better information on 
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clinical and cost-effectiveness could improve to a considerably greater degree than 
they would within a system that had only better HIT or better evidence. Similarly, 
the effect of combining enhanced payment for primary care and care coordination 
with more integrated delivery systems connected through information exchange 
could be more than the sum of the two individual effects. Therefore, the Lewin 
results represent a conservative “first-order” estimate, and probably understate 
what could be achieved by combining universal coverage with better information, 
public health initiatives, aligned incentives, and corrected price signals. 
 
Estimated Effect 
The estimates presented in the table above and in Exhibit 24 below illustrate the potential 
of multifaceted approaches for addressing short- and longer-term projected cost increases. In 
the first year, the estimates indicate net national savings of $31 billion, as savings more than 
offset the cost of insurance expansion. Over the 10-year period, multiple years of savings 
add up to a $1.55 trillion cumulative difference in expenditures below projected trends. 
 
Exhibit 24. Cumulative Impact on National Health
Expenditures (NHE) of Insurance Connector Approach
Plus Selected Individual Options
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The substantial $1.5 trillion reduction in national expenditures represents the 
cumulative effect of relatively small percentage changes in each year. The cumulative 
effect on expenditures of the combination of options grows rapidly year by year: the 
estimated reduction over 10 years is more than 50 times larger than that in the first year. 
Compared with the $4 trillion the nation is expected to spend 10 years from now—and 
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the more than $33 trillion in cumulative spending projected over that 10-year period—the 
reductions are modest, but they add up to substantial savings that could be available to 
address other societal needs. 
 
The modeling also indicates the potential of a multifaceted approach for yielding 
savings that could help offset the federal costs of financing insurance for all. In the first 
year, savings options could reduce net federal outlays by more than half of what they 
would be in the Insurance Connector scenario alone. By the end of a decade, the net 
federal costs could be negligible if bundled with options that focus on improving both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of care (Exhibit 25). 
 
Exhibit 25. Net Federal Spending with
Insurance Connector Alone Compared with Net Federal
with Insurance Plus Savings Options
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Discussion 
This combination option illustrates the potential benefits of combining broad changes 
intended to achieve universal coverage with specific policy changes to achieve savings in 
health spending. The universal coverage option by itself is estimated to result in an increase 
in national health expenditures of $218 billion over 10 years, but when combined with 
targeted savings policies described earlier in this report it achieves substantial net savings. 
 
Moreover, the potential exists for sharing savings across all major payer sectors. 
The federal government, which was projected to experience a large increase in spending 
over the next 10 years using only the universal coverage option, is projected to experience 
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modest increases over time with this combination option. State and local governments, 
which were projected to experience a decrease in spending using only the universal 
coverage option, are projected to experience still greater savings under the combination of 
policies modeled here. Private employers, which were expected to experience an increase 
in spending using only the universal coverage option, are projected to experience a more 
modest increase in spending under the combined option. Households, under both 
scenarios, achieve substantial savings. 
 
Savings of this magnitude, although substantial, would succeed in “bending the 
curve” to about halfway between the currently projected trend and the amount that would 
maintain the current proportion of national income devoted to health spending. At this 
rate, as illustrated in Exhibit 26, national health expenditures in 2017 would be held to 
18.5 percent, rather than the projected 19.8 percent if current trends continue. 
 
Exhibit 26. Total National Health Expenditures, 2008–2017 
Projected and Various Scenarios
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Savings on this scale—$1.5 trillion—represent an extremely large amount of 
resources that could be available to address other societal needs or goals, either within the 
health system or elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, in an environment in which 
affordable health care is available and markets operate with better information and 
payment reform, even greater savings might be achievable as policies interact to produce 
dynamic, synergistic gains over time. 
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Achieving the necessary changes in the way that health care is delivered and paid 
for will be a challenge, even though the “savings” from these policy changes would come 
primarily from reductions in the future growth, not the absolute amount, of health 
spending. With the level of health spending exceeding $2 trillion, billions of dollars in 
revenue and payments for providers and insurers—and tax dollars for the federal as well as 
state and local governments—are at stake. Changing the way that spending is distributed 
means changing the flow of income to the many groups that currently depend on and 
expect future increases. The insurance option modeled in the scenario relies on 
administrative cost savings and the adoption of Medicare payment rates to providers for a 
large share of the patients treated by physicians and hospitals. The savings options require 
moving to a new set of incentives and market signals that require better quality and lower 
costs, and redistribute health care payments. The public health initiatives require effective 
policies to effect change. And information system enhancements require successful 
implementation and adoption, which may require substantial investment at the outset. 
 
Embarking on such a multifaceted approach will require building consensus and a 
focus on gains in performance for the nation. The modeling indicates that potential 
savings could offset the costs of investing to improve performance and expand insurance to 
all. The projected cumulative effects point to the need to start sooner rather than later and 
craft coherent policies that enable a more integrated, whole-system approach. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As noted at the outset, the goal of the analysis is to spark discussion of possible federal 
policy actions that could put the nation on a path toward more sustainable spending 
growth, with improved access, quality, and outcomes. This options report was prepared 
on behalf of the Commission to help inform and assess potential approaches and to 
galvanize action to move in a new direction. The policies are presented as options rather 
than recommendations, to spur and inform debate and start to build consensus on a course 
of action that could address national health care costs in a manner that would yield greater 
value and better population health. The options represent a range of approaches to 
addressing inefficiencies and other factors in the current health care delivery and financing 
systems that contribute to high and rising costs. 
 
The focus in this report is on federal policies, because changes at the federal level 
would probably have the broadest immediate effects on national health spending and 
because those changes present the clearest, most definable models. However, states and 
private payers, as well as the federal government, confront the same underlying factors that 
contribute to high and rising costs. Many of these options could be implemented by 
private payers and by states through their Medicaid, state employee, or other state-
sponsored programs. Indeed, for most of the options discussed in this report, collaboration 
across the public and private sectors and at different levels of government would enhance 
and accelerate the potential to moderate cost trends and achieve better value for the dollars 
we invest in health care. National leadership will be critical for these efforts, with both the 
potential benefits and the necessary costs and sacrifices needing to be shared by all. 
 
Federal policy changes will also be essential to achieving nationwide change. Any 
approach that seeks to change the trajectory of national health expenditures would require 
federal participation and national leadership as well as coherent policies and actions that 
span the public and private sectors. With its national scope, Medicare has often been the 
source of innovations in payment policies, including the prospective payment system for 
hospitals and the resource-based relative value scale for physicians. The policy innovations 
have provided encouragement and served as models for private insurance and states to 
enact their own changes. Moreover, federal leadership will be instrumental in achieving 
affordable health insurance coverage for all, given the wide geographic disparities and gaps 
in coverage under the current system. 
 
The findings presented here illustrate that it would be possible to reduce national 
expenditures over the next decade while also improving access, quality, and population 
health. Achieving significant savings, however, will require a combination of policies that 
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enable the production and use of better information for health care decision-making, 
health promotion and disease prevention, closer alignment of financial incentives with 
health quality and efficiency, and correction of price signals in the health care market. 
Applying these policies collectively would capture the synergistic effects of specific 
innovations and could bring about dynamic change. Moreover, any policies aimed at 
accomplishing those objectives could be more effective in combination with affordable 
health insurance coverage for all, because they would apply to a larger share of the 
population and enable a more integrated approach to health care delivery and financing. 
 
The estimated effects of combining individual options in the context of affordable 
coverage for all could reduce projected health spending by $1.5 trillion over the next 10 
years. These estimated savings succeed in ‘bending the curve’ about half way from the 
currently projected trend to the amount that would maintain the current proportion of 
GDP devoted to health spending. Savings in national health expenditures of $1.5 trillion 
represent an extremely large amount of resources that could be available to address other 
societal needs or wants. Moreover, in an environment in which affordable health care is 
available and markets operate with better information and payment reform there is reason 
to believe that even greater savings might be achievable as policies interact to produce 
dynamic, synergistic gains over time. 
 
Modeling complex policy changes is inherently challenging and risky. The 
technical challenges include the uncertainty of estimating dynamic effects over a number 
of years. Also, these estimates are based on the assumption of effective design and 
implementation, and therefore do not reflect the difficulty of achieving agreement on the 
design of complex policy changes and the organizational adjustments required to 
implement them successfully. 
 
The stakes are very high, however, if we continue on the current path of 
escalating costs and eroding coverage. Envisioning and examining potential new policy 
directions are critical to the future health and economic security of the nation. 
Consequently, the Commission has sponsored this analysis of options to stimulate broader 
discussion of how to move the health care system in the right direction and to illustrate 
that it would be possible to achieve savings and improve value. 
 
Achieving these savings will require leadership in developing and implementing a 
set of coherent policies that address the multiple sources of high and rising costs in the 
U.S. health system. The effort will not be easy, and will require collaboration and a focus 
on the potential national gain. Building consensus on a shared vision of a better future will 
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be critical to action. Finding common ground will require a balanced view and a 
transcending of specific interests or ideologies to develop policies that could put the U.S. 
on a trajectory toward a health system that leads the world in health outcomes and 
innovation, reduces the fiscal pressure on federal as well as state and local government, and 
provides economic security for families and businesses. 
 
Cross-Cutting Themes and Conclusions 
Looking across the results of the analysis, several key themes emerge: 
 
• Improvement is possible and it is urgent to start now. The consequences of 
continuing the status quo, with respect to both human and economic costs, are 
very significant. The numbers of the uninsured are up sharply, and are moving up 
the economic ladder into middle-income families. Costs are squeezing households, 
businesses, and the public sector with spreading insecurity. The options illustrate 
that cost-savings are achievable in the context of a high performance health system. 
They also demonstrate that earlier enactment of even modest measures has the 
potential for later long-term benefits. 
• Better information is key to improved performance. It is difficult to 
improve the system without information on current performance—nationally, 
locally, and at the individual provider level. Transparency of information on 
quality and price is essential to a number of policies aimed at achieving higher 
performance. A valid, publicly available database on provider performance, 
appropriately adjusted for patient conditions, is critical to focusing providers on 
improving both quality and efficiency, enabling payers to construct rewards and 
other mechanisms that encourage such behavior, and providing patients with the 
information they need to make appropriate choices. Data on the patterns and 
causes of variations in spending across geographic areas are essential for developing 
policies to narrow such variations and provide consistently effective and 
appropriate care regardless of location. 
• Focusing on total health system costs, not shifting costs among sources 
of financing, should be the focus of policy action. Many of the policies 
proposed in the past have simply shifted costs from one payer source to another—
from government to employers or from payers to beneficiaries and patients. 
Narrow policies to cut governmental budget outlays by simply displacing those 
costs onto Medicare beneficiaries or paying substandard rates to providers under 
Medicaid are stop-gap measures that do not fundamentally address underlying 
health care cost trends. 
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• There are no magic bullets that by themselves fully address rising costs 
and key sources of inefficiency. Just as the steady increase in costs by comparison 
with incomes—which is projected to worsen over time—represents the 
cumulative effect of multiple and interacting factors, tackling cost levels and trends 
will require a coherent set of policies aimed at rectifying misaligned incentives and 
structural flaws that permeate our health system and produce the cost pressures we 
face. Design and effective implementation of policies matter. The solutions are not 
simple, and will require risk-taking and a willingness to invest, learn, and allow 
time for health systems and system capacity to improve through innovation. 
• A multifaceted approach integrated with health insurance coverage for all 
can be designed to achieve substantial reductions in future spending growth. 
Using a bundled approach, integrated with universal coverage focused on system 
performance, we should be able to reduce the growth of spending significantly 
over the next decade while maintaining and enhancing the health system’s capacity 
to improve and innovate. But we need to start now, with a strategic, coherent set 
of goals, policies, and incentives designed to address underlying factors 
contributing to costs without adding commensurate value. 
• Value means more than savings in national health expenditures. Higher 
value includes improved performance on quality, equity, access, and healthy lives, 
in addition to savings. A policy proposal that generates a modest savings but 
achieves substantial improvement in access or health outcomes may be as valuable, 
or more so, than one that generates larger savings, but with minimal improvements 
in attaining other health system goals. Options that extend health insurance to all, 
promote the public’s health, improve information and lead to more-informed 
patient decisions, enhance quality and care coordination, and eliminate waste, 
duplication, and unnecessary care all contribute to value and performance. 
• Reaching consensus will require a focus on the potential gain for the nation. 
This report focused on options that are win-win—that is, that both achieve savings 
and contribute to improving key dimensions of health system performance. Yet, 
approaches that substantially reduce projected expenditures over time will by 
definition decrease revenues for some segments of the health care sector. 
• Achieving high performance will require that every stakeholder take part 
in finding solutions. Across the options, the estimated distribution of savings or 
net new cost varies among major payers—the federal government, state and local 
governments, employers, and households. Achieving national health system savings 
may require a shift in payment sources and an increase in federal outlays. It will 
also require that providers be willing to address past inequities where those 
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providers caring for the uninsured and poor received lower compensation than 
those serving privately insured patients. Narrow self-interest is a major barrier to 
changes that have the potential to benefit all. Constructive approaches will also 
require political compromises, not ideological purity. As a nation, we will need to 
move beyond the point where everyone’s second choice is the status quo. 
• Leadership is critical. Building consensus will require leadership and public-
private collaboration, and a coherent set of goals, policies, incentives, and tools. 
Options will work better if public and private policies align toward a common aim 
of achieving a high performance health system. Consensus will also require a 
whole-system view: aiming for improved cost trends while improving population 
health and achieving continuous improvement over time. 
 
In summary, the range of options considered in this report illustrates strategic 
approaches that could, in combination, ease cost pressures and move toward a higher 
performance, high-value health system. As a nation, we will all gain if we focus on 
improving the value we obtain for the $2 trillion that we are now spending on health 
care—a sum that will continue to consume a greater share of our nation’s economic 
resources without yielding commensurate gains in value if we fail to act. With rising costs 
stressing business, family, and public budgets, and with one in four adults uninsured, much 
is at stake. 
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APPENDIX. THE INSURANCE CONNECTOR APPROACH: 
PROVIDING AFFORDABLE COVERAGE FOR ALL WITH 
MIXED PRIVATE-PUBLIC GROUP INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
SPECIFICATIONS AND MODELING RESULTS 
 
Specifications 
This policy option would use a blended private–public insurance approach to achieve 
affordable coverage for all that builds on and connects private group insurance and public 
insurance by creating a new federally sponsored “connector.” The Insurance Connector 
would offer a structured choice between a self-insured, Medicare-sponsored option and a 
selection of integrated health plans. To reach near-universal coverage with affordability, it 
includes an individual mandate and premium assistance, with automatic enrollment through 
the tax system. This insurance approach includes the following core features: 
 
• Connector. The private and public sectors would be “connected” by offering 
a structured choice of health plans for individual and small firms (under 100 
employees). The choices would include a self-insured option run by Medicare, 
using Medicare payment rates and fiscal intermediaries to pay claims. Medicare 
benefits would be enhanced to include prescription drugs and unified cost-
sharing.77 The Connector would also provide a choice of integrated plans offered 
to federal employees, Congress, and the Medicare population. 
• Medicaid. The Medicaid program would be expanded to cover all those with 
incomes up to 150 percent of the federal poverty level for acute-care medical 
services. Medicaid provider rates would be increased to Medicare levels. Federal 
matching would be at the enhanced SCHIP rate. 
• Medicare Expansion. The two-year waiting period for the disabled would be 
eliminated. Adults age 60 and older would be eligible to buy in early. All Medicare 
beneficiaries would have the option of buying an integrated supplemental plan 
from Medicare. 
• Individual Mandate with Premium Assistance. All residents would be required 
to have insurance meeting minimum criteria. Tax credits/premium assistance would 
be available to limit premium costs to 5 percent of income for households in the 
lowest income tax bracket and 10 percent of income in higher-income households. 
• “Play or Pay.” Employers would be required to provide coverage or contribute 
7 percent of payroll, up to $1.25 an hour, into a national insurance trust fund. The 
maximum age for dependent children for family coverage would be increased to 26. 
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• Broad Risk Pooling. To protect against adverse selection and avoid competition 
based on health risks, the Connector and premium assistance would be available 
only in states that require modified community rating and guaranteed issue. 
• Financing. As partial financing, the option includes assessments of 4 percent of 
hospital revenues and 2 percent of physician revenues. Federal funds for uninsured 
and Medicaid patients (e.g., disproportionate share hospital, or DSH, payments) 
would be reallocated to the trust fund. 
 
Coverage and Costs of Insurance Expansion Without Other Policy Changes 
Coverage. The mixed private-public approach with required participation would achieve 
near-universal coverage, insuring about 45 million of the estimated 48.3 million uninsured 
in 2008. The modeling estimates that about 20 percent of the population—60 million 
people—would enroll in the Insurance Connector. Of these, an estimated two-thirds 
would select Medicare and one-third would opt for integrated plans. Including those 
choosing Medicare through the Connector, Medicare total enrollment would double. 
Medicaid/SCHIP would have a net expansion of about 4 million. The individual 
insurance market share would decline as participants opted for other sources. 
 
Employers would continue to be the primary sponsors of coverage for the under-
65 population. An estimated 141.5 million people would receive insurance through 
employers purchasing coverage directly. Another 46 million people working for small 
employers would join the Connector as those employers opted in. As a result, 63 percent 
of the population would have employer-sponsored coverage. 
 
 
Annual Net Impact if Insurance Reforms Alone, Without Savings Options  Cumulative Net Impact 
$ billions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2008–2012 2008–2017 
National Health 
Expenditure 15.3 16.5 17.7 19.0 20.5 22.1 23.8 25.5 27.5 29.7  89.0 217.6 
Federal 
Government 81.7 90.4 100.1 110.6 122.3 135.8 150.1 166.1 184.4 204.6  505.1 1346.1 
State and Local 
Government –11.5 –12.4 –13.3 –14.3 –15.4 –16.6 –17.9 –19.2 –20.7 –22.3  –66.9 –163.5 
Private 
Employers 21.0 22.1 23.3 24.5 25.8 27.1 28.5 30.0 31.6 33.3  116.6 267.3 
Households –75.9 –83.7 –92.2 –101.7 –112.2 –124.3 –137.0 –151.4 –167.8 –185.9  –465.8 –1232.2 
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Spending. If the Insurance Connector is implemented with no other changes, the 
modeling estimates that it would result in a net increase in national health expenditures of 
$15 billion—on a base of over $2 trillion expected in 2008. Increases in total national 
health expenditures resulting from covering the uninsured and improving coverage would 
be partially offset by reductions in health insurance administrative costs ($15.4 billion) and 
net savings in provider reimbursement ($20.8 billion). The net administrative savings 
derive from using Medicare’s claims payment arrangements and savings from more 
efficient supplemental coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. The net savings from provider 
reimbursement result from extension of Medicare’s payment rates to a larger share of the 
population and provider assessments offsetting the costs of raising Medicaid payment rates 
to Medicare levels. 
 
The Lewin model estimates that the approach would amount to a cumulative 
increase in total national health spending of $218 billion over 10 years. As specified, the 
option would result in a net reduction in state and local spending as well as household 
spending. There would be a net increase in employer spending for premium contributions 
of $267 billion as a result of the employer mandate.78 
 
Federal expenditures would increase to pay for premium assistance, the increased 
federal match for low-income programs, and improved financial protection for Medicare 
beneficiaries. These expenses would be partially offset by the reallocation of DSH funds 
and by provider assessments. However, there would be a net increase in federal spending 
of about $82 billion in the first full year. The table above shows the estimated cumulative 
effect over five and 10 years. Assuming that health care expenditures continue to grow 
faster than incomes, the cost of the federal tax credits to make premiums affordable in 
relation to income would mount over time. Full financing of the estimated net increase in 
federal expenditures would require additional sources of revenue or offsets from other 
federal policy changes. 
 
Discussion 
This private-public group insurance approach to insurance for all would allow those with 
insurance to remain with their current coverage while providing new choices. Achieving 
the goal of seamless, continuous coverage would require mechanisms that make it easy to 
enroll and stay covered. There would also be a need to protect the safety net capacity to 
care for those remaining uninsured. 
 
The approach builds on Medicare’s nationwide scope and claims-payment 
arrangements across the country. Yet it also maintains a competitive market for insurance 
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with a substantial role for private plans, and introduces a new competitive dynamic with 
Medicare and private plans competing. Private insurance plans, particularly those active in 
small group and individual insurance markets, would likely see such competition as a threat. 
 
Offering Medicare as an option for a greater share of the population would mean 
extending Medicare provider rates to more patients. Providers that currently see mainly private 
patients would stand to lose revenue. However, if more-unified insurance systems reduced 
administrative costs for physicians and hospitals, those savings would accrue to providers. 
 
There is evidence that current Medicare rates underpay for primary care and 
managing chronic disease while favoring more specialized care and procedures. Efforts to 
build on Medicare would therefore need to consider changes in payment methods to 
enhance primary care and improve coordinated care. 
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